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The Geography of Abortion Rights 





Total or near-total abortion bans passed in recent years have garnered tremendous 
public attention. But another recent wave of more modest-looking abortion restrictions 
consists of laws regulating the geography of abortion provision through management of 
spaces, places, and borders. In the 1990s and early 2000s, numerous states adopted 
laws regulating the physical spaces where abortions can be performed. These laws 
include mandates that abortions be performed in particular kinds of places, such as 
ambulatory surgical centers, or that abortion-providing facilities have agreements in 
place with local hospitals. One consequence of such regulations has been to reduce the 
availability of abortion services within the geographical borders of a particular state 
and to require people to travel out of state in order to terminate a pregnancy. Other 
abortion controversies, too, have foregrounded the significance of state and even national 
borders, as in the cases of unaccompanied immigrant minors who sought abortions 
while in the custody of the U.S. Government. Thus, an entire subset of abortion 
restrictions intentionally targets the geography of abortion provision, inevitably impacts 
the geographical distribution of abortion services, or both. Yet, the geographical 
dimension of abortion restrictions has gone largely unappreciated in the legal literature.  
This Article thus aims to provide an overview of the geography of abortion regulation. 
It first considers the unique impact and attractiveness of spatial regulations, 
demonstrating that spatial regulations differ from other forms of abortion regulation in 
their tendency to exploit and aggravate preexisting social inequality in ways that make 
it appear natural or unavoidable. Second, this Article considers the jurisprudential 
implications of this “spatial turn” in three specific areas: the right to travel, private 
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The Geography of Abortion Rights 
B. Jessie Hill1 
 
109 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) 
 
Introduction 
Public attention has focused on the infringement of reproductive 
liberty in the form of total or near-total abortion bans passed in recent 
years.2 But another recent wave of more modest-looking abortion 
restrictions consists of laws regulating the geography of abortion 
provision through the management of spaces, places, and borders. In the 
1990s and early 2000s, numerous states adopted laws regulating the 
physical spaces where abortions can be performed.3 These laws contrast 
with laws regulating the abortion process itself, such as waiting periods 
and parental consent requirements for minors. Laws regulating abortion 
spaces include mandates that abortions be performed in particular kinds 
 
1 Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. An early version 
of this paper was presented the Health Law Professors conference in Cleveland, Ohio 
in 2018. I would like to thank Glenn Cohen, Jonathan Entin, Marc Spindelman, and 
Mary Ziegler. Becca Kendis provided excellent research assistance. 
2 In 2019, nine states passed laws banning abortions at a point in pregnancy that is 
well before viability. Alabama enacted a total ban on abortion; Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi and Ohio banned abortion when a fetal heartbeat can be 
detected (as early as six weeks of pregnancy); Missouri passed a law banning abortion 
at eight weeks gestation; and Arkansas and Utah banned abortion at 18 weeks. See 
generally K.K. Rebecca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills to Limit the Procedure 
This Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019); Elizabeth Nash et al., State Policy Trends 2019: 
A Wave of Abortion Bans, but Some States Are Fighting Back (Dec. 10, 2019),  
guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends-2019-wave-abortion-bans-some-
states-are-fighting-back. North Dakota and Iowa had previously passed first-trimester 
abortion bans. Elizabeth Nash, A Surge in Bans on Abortion as Early as Six Weeks, 
Before Most People Know They Are Pregnant (updated May 30, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/03/surge-bans-abortion-early-six-weeks-
most-people-know-they-are-pregnant. None of these bans is currently in effect. 
3 Such laws existed previously, but a large number were adopted in the 1990s and 
2000s. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue-Burden Test After 
Casey/Hellerstedt, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 421, 451 (2017) (hereinafter Ziegler, 
Liberty); Alan Guttmacher Inst., TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion 
Clinics—and the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, Guttmacher Policy Review 
(June 25, 2013), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2013/06/trap-laws-gain-political-
traction-while-abortion-clinics-and-women-they-serve-pay-price. 
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of places, such as ambulatory surgical centers, or that abortion-providing 
facilities have agreements in place with local hospitals.4  
Some, known as TRAP laws (for Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Providers), impose particularly onerous restrictions only on 
abortion providers and not on facilities providing comparable health care 
services.5  Justified as being necessary to protect the health and safety of 
patients, these laws are, in part, a result of anti-abortion activists’ turn 
toward “woman-protective” arguments.6 Such arguments fed into a 
broader incremental strategy for undermining Roe v. Wade’s7 
constitutional protection for abortion by winning public support for the 
anti-abortion cause, especially in light of the failure of other anti-abortion 
strategies, and by exploiting the ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey8 precedent.9 
But geography and space are implicated in abortion laws in ways 
that go beyond the narrow category of restrictions described above. Most 
obviously, one (largely intended) consequence of facility regulations has 
been to reduce the availability of abortion services within the 
geographical borders of a particular state and to require some people to 
travel out of state in order to terminate a pregnancy. As discussed below, 
state borders come to play a significant role in courts’ evaluation of the 
constitutionality of these laws. Other abortion controversies, too, such 
as the case of unaccompanied immigrant minors who sought abortions 
while in the custody of the U.S. Government, have foregrounded the 
significance of state and even national borders.10 
 
4 Alan Guttmacher Inst., Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-
providers 
5 See, e.g., Mandee Silverman, RU-486: A Dramatic New Choice or Forum for Continued 
Abortion Controversy?, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 247, 280 (2000). 
6 Ziegler, Liberty, supra note 3, at 447. 
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
9 Ziegler, Politics of Balance, supra note 3, at 441-42, 447; Mary Ziegler, Liberty: Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 
97-101; see also generally Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion 
Restrictions under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1707-32 (2008). Siegel discusses 
the shift toward incrementalism and a focus on “woman-protective” legislation in the 
context of “partial-birth” abortion bans. As I discuss below, infra Part XX, such bans 
can be considered as a species of spatial regulation. 
10 Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145, 151 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd in part, vacated in 
part, remanded sub nom. J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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Finally, another set of abortion regulations may be understood as 
spatial regulations, although they are not usually described as such. These 
are laws that involve visual and narrative mapping of physical spaces 
within the woman’s body. In this category are laws that require an 
ultrasound before an abortion, often accompanied by a description of 
the fetal anatomy—a delineation of internal anatomical space projected, 
like a map, on the screen. The federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act is 
another example of a law that regulates the geography of women’s11 
bodies, by designating internal “anatomical landmarks” as trigger points 
for state control of the abortion procedure.12 
Despite its apparent significance, the geographical dimension of 
abortion restrictions has gone largely unappreciated in the legal 
literature.13 This article thus attempts a comprehensive overview of the 
 
11 This Article occasionally uses “women” as shorthand for individuals who may seek 
abortion, because abortion restrictions disproportionately affect women and are often 
targeted specifically at women, while recognizing that individuals of all gender 
identities, including transgender men and non-conforming people, may become 
pregnant and seek abortions. 
12 18 U.S.C. § 1531. See infra ___ for a discussion of the Act’s “anatomical landmarks.” 
13 There are, of course, a few exceptions. A handful of articles from the 1990s and 
early 2000s consider the constitutional issues surrounding hypothetical extraterritorial 
abortion restrictions. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender, Abortion, and Travel After 
Roe’s End, 51 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 655 (2007); Richard H. Fallon, If Roe Were 
Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 611 
(2007); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom…”: The Right to Travel and 
Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1993); Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of 
Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in 
American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992). This somewhat narrow issue is 
addressed below in Part V.B. More recently, Professor Glenn Cohen has discussed 
abortion, among other medical procedures, in his work on circumvention tourism, 
with a primary focus on international rather than domestic travel. See, e.g., I. GLENN 
COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS: MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW, AND ETHICS 318-21, 
347-56 (2015); I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 
1363-73 (2012). Lisa Pruitt and Marta Vanegas have written incisively about the role 
of “urbanormativity” and spatial privilege in shaping the judicial understanding of the 
burdens imposed on women—particularly rural women—by abortion restrictions. 
Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind 
Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & J. 76 (2015); see also Lisa R. 
Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 338 
(2008). And Mae Kuykendall discusses abortion restrictions, among other contexts in 
which the concept of place plays a role in law. See Mae Kuykendall, Restatement of Place, 
79 BROOKLYN L. REV. 757, 787-793 (2014); see also B. Jessie Hill, Dangerous Terrain: 
Mapping the Female Body in Gonzales v. Carhart, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 649 (2010) 
(discussing the way in which Gonzales v. Carhart presents the woman’s internal 
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geography of abortion regulation, focusing primarily on two questions. 
The first question pertains to the unique impact of spatial regulation: 
How are the effects of spatial regulation different from those of other 
forms of abortion regulation? The answer proposed by this Article is that 
regulating place is a way of subtly drawing lines of social exclusion and 
inclusion and reinscribing social inequality along the dimensions of 
gender and socio-economic status, while at the same time concealing this 
operation. This facet of spatial regulation has made it particularly 
attractive to advocates and legislators seeking to restrict access to 
abortion. Moreover, borders—whether geographical or anatomical—
have the capacity to create and reinforce politics of inclusion and 
exclusion not so much because of whom they include or exclude, but 
because the ability to manipulate those borders is itself a key mechanism 
of control. Whether borders are being strengthened or made more 
permeable, the key fact is not the existence of the border but rather its 
deployment for political and moral ends. 
The second question concerns the implications of this “spatial 
turn” for the development of abortion jurisprudence (and perhaps other 
areas of constitutional jurisprudence as well). This Article suggests that 
there are at least three ways in which the spatial perspective on abortion 
regulation might affect constitutional doctrine. First, placing substantive 
due process jurisprudence pertaining to spatial regulation side-by-side 
with right-to-travel and equal protection jurisprudence suggests a deep 
connection between the substantive due process jurisprudence of 
reproductive liberty and the constitutional concept of equal citizenship. 
Importantly, it suggests that states may have a constitutional obligation 
to ensure a certain, non-negligible level of abortion access for their 
residents. Second, a fresh understanding of spatial regulation might 
encourage constitutional scholars to reconsider the conventional 
understanding of state action. The taken-for-grantedness of physical 
space often renders invisible the action of the state in creating, 
manipulating, and reinforcing borders. On-the-ground effects that are 
driven by state action nonetheless appear to be private decisions for 
which only private individuals are responsible. A clear-eyed 
understanding of spatial abortion regulation should aid courts and 
advocates in counteracting this appearance through a revival of one line 
 
anatomy as a physical terrain). There is, however, significant room for expansion on 
the topic of geography in relation to abortion rights. In fact, I owe a debt of gratitude 
to Mae Kuykendall for encouraging me to expand on this topic. 
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of of non-delegation doctrine, which forbids private entities from 
exercising unreviewable and standardless power over individuals’ 
constitutional rights. Third and finally, this Article suggests that a healthy 
degree of skepticism is appropriate with respect to claims about 
supposedly fixed or objective borders, even in the medical realm. Thus, 
judges should view with great skepticism claims that scientific advances 
have undermined the premises supporting the Supreme Court’s reliance 
on viability as the appropriate borderline for when abortion can be 
prohibited. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the central 
theoretical premises of this Article, examining how borders and travel 
are related to sovereignty and to women’s liberty. Part II then discusses 
the current state of abortion facility regulation in the U.S. That Part 
argues that abortion facility regulation has the effect of contributing to 
the unequal citizenship of women by isolating abortion, both physically 
and legally, from health care generally. Moreover, one effect of onerous 
and discriminatory regulation of abortion facilities is to shut down 
abortion clinics in an attempt to create “abortion-free zones” within 
states. Building on this insight, Part III discusses the regulation of 
abortion in connection with state and national borders. It argues that 
such borders play an essential role in defining citizenship, and that the 
presumed inevitability of borders both reinforces and conceals the state’s 
intent to remove from women one of the key attributes of citizenship. 
Turning to abortion’s “internal” geography, Part IV next considers how 
abortion laws focused on women’s physical anatomy function as spatial 
regulation, deploying the manipulation of borders as a means of 
sovereignty and control. Finally, Part V brings together the prior three 
parts by highlighting the themes that unite all three forms of spatial 
regulation and by suggesting some ways in which constitutional law 
might take account of the more problematic aspects of spatial abortion 
regulation. 
A final introductory note: at the time of this writing, the 
constitutional status of the right to terminate a pregnancy appears as 
precarious as it has been in the years since Roe v. Wade14 was decided. A 
Supreme Court decision in the near future could well, in one sense, 
render the analysis here moot, insofar as no woman will have a federal 
constitutional right to abortion and therefore notions of state action and 
equal protection deriving from that right may appear irrelevant. Spatial 
 
14 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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regulations may be replaced by total abortion bans. From another 
perspective, however, a post-Roe world might only be a starker version 
of the world that already exists. Before Roe, some women had the ability 
to end unwanted pregnancies and others did not.15 A woman’s access to 
procreative liberty varied then, as now, depending on geography, as well 
as on social class.16 This geographical and social inequality will likely 
persist, as will the constitutional questions surrounding the scope of state 
power, even if Roe does not. The U.S. may end up with a patchwork in 
which some states outlaw abortion in nearly all circumstances, whereas 
others guarantee liberal access.17 Indeed, such questions—and the 
importance of geography—will only intensify as states may consider 
exercising their power extraterritorially.18 The possibility of constitutional 
change, in fact, generates an even more pressing need for a new set of 
arguments with which to challenge restrictions on women’s reproductive 
freedom, such as those presented here. 
I. Spatial Regulation and the Meaning of  
Reproductive Liberty  
 
Control over borders is an essential attribute of sovereignty. In 
controlling ingress and egress to the nation, according to traditional 
views of sovereignty, the state determines who is entitled to the benefits 
and protections of membership in a given political community;19 it 
engages in acts of inclusion and exclusion.20 In theory at least, political 
borders mark the point at which certain legal protections come into 
 
15 See, e.g., LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 16 (1997). 
16 See, e.g., id. at 16. 
17 Alternately, it is possible that federal legislation will be adopted to govern access to 
abortion nationwide. 
18 Fallon, supra note 13; Appleton, supra note 13; see also infra ___. 
19 This is the classical, “Westphalian” understanding of the state, in which legal rights 
and remedies “are connected to, or limited by, territorial location.” Kal Raustiala, The 
Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2503 (2005); see also id. at 2508-11. As 
Kal Raustiala has shown, this conception has considerable staying power, despite the 
fact that it no longer reflects legal realities and lacks a rational conceptual foundation. 
Id. at 2513-28. 
20 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 526-27 (2009) 
(“Sovereigns use territory to control access to the critical prize of membership or 
citizenship…. To enforce the spatiality of citizenship and membership, sovereigns 
must possess the authority to control territorial borders—to repel and expel.”). 
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effect, as well as the scope of state sovereignty or power over individuals. 
For example, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.”21 The Fourteenth Amendment’s operation thus depends on 
geographical facts in its references to the location of birth and of 
residence, as well as to being within the “jurisdiction” of the United 
States. State and national borders mark the dividing line between those 
who are “in”—that is, entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities 
of citizenship—and those who are “out.”22 Spatial regulation is therefore 
not only a quintessential exercise of sovereignty, but also one that is 
fraught with the possibility of creating and enforcing inequality. 
Moreover, despite the fact that they often rely on natural features, 
such as rivers and mountains, state and national borders are 
fundamentally artificial—they are creations of law.23 The only reason a 
river, or a mountain range, or a particular set of coordinates on a map 
has legal significance, after all, is because it was given that significance by 
legal actors. Perhaps recognizing this artificiality, modern legal doctrine 
has rejected territory as the primary basis of legal power or jurisdiction, 
favoring residence or citizenship instead.24 A focus on residence or 
citizenship appears to entail a more consensual basis for the state exercise 
of power over individuals: if individuals willingly choose to live in a 
particular state and partake of its benefits, they should also expect to be 
subject to the burden of that state’s rules. 
The legal conception of borders thus partakes of two 
contradictory but often coexisting conceptions, as explained in Richard 
Ford’s groundbreaking scholarship on geography and racial 
segregation.25 In one conception, which basically aligns with the 
territorial conception of jurisdiction, political geography is seen as 
“opaque” in the sense that, like the rivers and mountains themselves, it 
is “inert, primordial, natural, and therefore having a natural or 
 
21 U.S. CONST. amdt. XIV. 
22 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
23 Judith Resnik, “Within Its Jurisdiction”: Moving Boundaries, People, and the Law of 
Migration, 160 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 117, 117 (2016). 
24 For helpful and concise discussions of this shift, see Cohen, supra note 13, at 1329-
35, and Fallon, supra note 13, at 629-32. 
25 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1859 (1994). 
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prepolitical meaning.”26 In the other conception, perhaps represented by 
the conceptual view of jurisdiction, space and geography are 
“transparent”—that is, “irrelevant, both superseded in importance by the 
modern technologies of transportation and communication, and 
insignificant and without consequences of its own.”27 Interestingly, both 
conceptions take responsibility away from the state for the effects of laws 
that rely upon geographical facts, concealing and ignoring the extent to 
which decisions by individuals with political power in turn shape those 
geographies, with predictable and often intended effects on individuals 
within them. 
The regulation of geography is closely related to reproductive 
liberty in two ways. First, to the extent that the right to procreative 
control is understood to be a fundamental right—a basic appurtenance 
of citizenship28— state laws creating a patchwork of abortion access raise 
the prospect of unequal federal citizenship based on geography.29 This 
reality turns on its head the Supreme Court’s recognition in Doe v. Bolton 
that the right to seek abortion services is an aspect of the “privileges and 
immunities” of state citizenship, instead creating a form of spatial 
inequality.30  
Secondly, liberty and geography are deeply intertwined. In the 
most basic sense, “liberty” is the liberty of movement. It is the freedom 
from bodily constraints and geographical barriers that prevent free 
motion. Indeed, according to Blackstone, “[p]ersonal liberty consists in 
the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s 
person to whatever place one’s own inclination may direct, without 




28 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (holding that a state residency 
requirement for abortions violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
of the U.S. Constitution). 
29 See, e.g., Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 422 (S.D. 
Miss. 2013) (noting that the logic according to which states can avoid their 
responsibility to ensure protect abortion access “by merely saying that abortions are 
available elsewhere” would lead to “a patchwork system where constitutional rights 
are available in some states but not in others”); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 627 (1969) (holding that minimum residency requirements for public welfare 
benefits “create two classes of needy resident families” and violate equal protection 
with respect to the right to travel). 
30 Doe, 410 U.S. at 200. 
311 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130, cited in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 39 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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no less an originalist than Justice Clarence Thomas has embraced this 
definition, arguing that the term “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
fundamentally connotes nothing more than “freedom from physical 
restraint.”32 But this concept of liberty–while considerably less expansive 
than the modern notion of liberty as encompassing the right to privacy 
and decision-making autonomy33—is not necessarily a crabbed or archaic 
one: a concept of liberty grounded in freedom of movement may also 
support a broad conception of reproductive liberty as intimately related 
to women’s right to travel, to cross state borders while retaining the 
appurtenances of citizenship, and to societal mobility. 
Indeed, the liberty of movement, broadly understood, is an 
essential aspect of reproductive liberty. Liberty of bodily movement is 
arguably the most fundamental attribute of citizenship, just as a 
fundamental attribute of slavery consists in the inability to leave captivity, 
to choose where one will enter or stay.34 Likewise, involuntary 
parenthood constrains women’s options. Pregnancy may in some cases 
literally constrain women’s physical movement; but more importantly, 
parenthood may limit women’s social and economic mobility—which 
also often involves geographic mobility.35 At the same time, the need to 
access abortion may force women to engage in unwanted travel, perhaps 
even out of state, as the Supreme Court recognized in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, in striking down the Texas law that would have closed 
nearly all of Texas’s abortion clinics and left broad swaths of the state 
with no abortion access at all.36  
The constitutional right to travel has itself long been intertwined 
with racial and gender equality. Dred Scott v. Sandford, for example, 
involved the question whether an American slave became free by 
traveling to territory in which slavery was not recognized, thus garnering 
 
32 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting); see also 
Raoul Berger, Liberty and the Constitution, 29 GA. L. REV. 585, 587-88 (1995); Charles 
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 444–
45 (1926). 
33 The classic case, of course, is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Id. at 153. 
34 Of course, liberty of movement across state borders is also an essential aspect of 
American federalism. 
35 See, e.g., Diana Greene Foster, et al., Socioeconomic Outcomes of Women Who Receive and 
Women Who Are Denied Wanted Abortions in the United States, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
407 (2018). 
36 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016), as revised (June 
27, 2016). 
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the benefits of that legal regime.37 This question was situated within a 
broader political, legal, and moral battle over the power of states to 
exercise extraterritorial power and impose their views on slavery—
whether pro or con—on citizens of other states that might disagree.38 Of 
course, the Supreme Court’s denial of Scott’s citizenship meant that he 
could not benefit from the anti-slavery regime of other states; it thus 
denied him, among many other things, a meaningful right to travel and 
to move about freely at will. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Supreme Court 
struck down state laws imposing minimum residency requirements on 
indigent people, which were adopted with the specific goal of deterring 
poor families from moving to those states.39 The Court noted that “the 
nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal 
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the 
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or 
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”40 
And in Saenz v. Roe,41 the U.S. Supreme Court vindicated the right of 
several women who were fleeing to California in order to get away from 
abusive relationships in their home states to avail themselves of public 
benefits under California law on the same terms as other citizens of the 
state.42 In all of these cases, claimants asserted a right to equality in the 
form of a claim of equal citizenship that was intimately connected to the 
right to travel—that is, a right to avail themselves of certain fundamental 
privileges regardless of their states of residence. 
This basic framework, connecting the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantees of liberty, equality, and fundamental rights to the right to 
travel and to freedom of movement more generally, represents both a 
lost history and a way forward in challenging spatial regulation of 
abortion. As Parts II through IV demonstrate, governments control 
women’s bodies and subject them to second-class citizenship through 
the control of borders and physical spaces. This form of state control 
often goes unrecognized for what it is, because spatial regulation has a 
tendency to appear more neutral, or less the result of official mandates, 
 
37 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 394 (1857). 
38 See generally Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 13, at 466-69. 
39 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1969). 
40 Id. at 629. 
41 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
42 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 494. Susan Frelich Appleton points out this fact about the 
plaintiffs in Gender, Abortion, and Travel, supra note 13, at 674. 
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than it actually is. For this reason, as Part V argues, a new conception of 
liberty and equal citizenship is urgently needed. 
II. Regulation of  the Spaces Where Abortions Take 
Place: Enforcing the Physical and Doctrinal 
Isolation of  Abortion 
This Part begins with an overview of facility regulations, which 
are the most obvious and straightforward example of spatial regulation 
of abortion. Such laws impose particular requirements on the places 
where abortions may be performed. They usually have the widely 
recognized and expected effect of making abortion more expensive and 
more difficult to provide and receive, and as a result, advocates have 
challenged them as imposing an undue burden on abortion access. As 
discussed below in Part I.B., they also have less obvious effects that make 
them a particularly attractive form of legislation for lawmakers seeking 
to restrict access to abortion. 
 
A. The Law and Policy of Abortion Facility Regulation 
 
Facility regulations have a lengthy pedigree, but they seem to 
have become particularly popular in more recent years among states 
seeking to restrict abortion access. Roe v. Wade had left open the 
possibility that laws regulating the places where abortions are performed 
would be found constitutional.43 And indeed, abortion opponents began 
introducing such laws as early as the 1970s.44 But they did not appear to 
gain steam until the 1990s and 2000s, perhaps due to those groups’ 
perception that Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in 1992, had further opened 
the door to them.45 In Casey, the Supreme Court held that abortion 
restrictions would no longer be subject to strict scrutiny and instead 
would pass muster if they did not constitute an “undue burden” on 
 
43 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“[A] State may regulate the abortion 
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and 
protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are 
requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as 
to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be 
performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other 
place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.”) 
44 See, e.g., Ziegler, Liberty, at 441. 
45 Id. at 442. 
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abortion access.46 Casey thus introduced a notably amorphous legal 
standard that seemed to invite envelope-pushing by states seeking to 
restrict abortion. Facility regulations also fit well with anti-abortion 
groups’ strategy of inducing incremental change in abortion law rather 
than seeking the wholesale overruling of Roe v. Wade, and they allowed 
those groups to present themselves as interested in protecting the welfare 
of women.47 Thus, a confluence of historical and political factors, 
gathering over at least two decades, led advocacy groups to push for, and 
anti-abortion legislators in many states to adopt, an array of laws that 
targeted abortion clinics, rather than the abortion procedure itself.  
Some such laws take the form of physical plant specifications 
pertaining to corridor width, and the size of procedure rooms.48 Others 
include requirements that providers of abortion outside the hospital 
setting must have admitting privileges at a hospital or an agreement or 
affiliation with a hospital or provider with admitting privileges.49 Some 
of these laws even apply to facilities where only non-surgical abortions—
early abortions completed with the use of medications only—are 
offered.50 Often, these requirements are expensive to comply with, and 
in some places it can be impossible for an abortion clinic to find a 
hospital or a non-abortion-providing physician willing to enter into an 
affiliation with it.51  
Though ostensibly aimed at ensuring the safety of the abortion 
procedure, such regulations often have minimal safety benefits, which 
are largely outweighed by their significant burden on abortion access.52 
For example, a requirement that a physician performing abortions in a 
clinic maintain hospital admitting privileges may turn out to be 
impossible to comply with in many places. The term “admitting 
privileges” refers to a doctor’s authority, granted by the hospital, to admit 
patients to stay overnight at that hospital and to treat them there; 
generally, a hospital treats the grant of admitting privileges as equivalent 
 
46 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
47 Ziegler, Liberty, at 442. 
48 See, e.g., Alan Guttmacher Inst., supra note 4. 
49 Id. 
50 Nineteen states currently apply such requirements in facilities where medication-
only abortions are performed. Id. 
51 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312 (2016); 
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 916-17 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
52 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct at 2310-11. 
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to making a doctor a member of its staff.53 Because abortions are 
provided primarily in non-hospital settings, however, an abortion 
provider is unlikely to have a relationship with a hospital unless she also 
treats other kinds of patients. Moreover, some hospitals require a certain 
number of patient admissions in order for a physician to receive and 
maintain privileges; because abortion is a safe, minor surgical procedure 
generally performed in an outpatient setting, it rarely results in hospital 
admission (which would only be required in the case of a relatively 
serious complication).54 Finally, hospitals may decline to extend 
admitting privileges to a physician for any reason, including reasons 
unrelated to clinical competence, and many do so either because their 
religious affiliation does not permit them to affiliate with an abortion 
provider, or simply because they wish to avoid the controversy associated 
with doing so.55 
Litigation concerning facility regulations has been particularly 
active in recent years as courts have worked to apply the “undue burden” 
framework in this context. In 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of two different 
abortion facility regulations adopted by the state of Texas: a requirement 
that abortion providers have admitting privileges at a local hospital and 
a requirement that abortion clinics conform to expensive physical plant 
requirements so as to qualify as ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs), 
without the opportunity for waiver or for grandfathering of existing 
clinics.56 In articulating the legal standard it would apply, the Court in 
Whole Woman’s Health claimed that “Casey … requires that courts consider 
 
53 Id.. at 2312; Schimel, 806 F.3d at 909. 
54 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312-13; Schimel, 806 F. 3d at 916-97. 
55 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312-13; EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. 
Glisson, No. 3:17-CV-00189-GNS, 2018 WL 6444391, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 
2018) (noting that the termination of a hospital’s transfer agreement with Planned 
Parenthood was partly due to “public controversy,” as well as the expressed view of 
the Archdiocese of Louisville) , appeal docketed,  18-6161 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2018); see 
generally Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 412–13 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1967) (“It is a well-settled rule that a private hospital has the right to refuse to 
appoint a physician or surgeon to its medical staff, and this refusal is not subject to 
judicial review; the decision of the hospital authorities in such matters is final.” (citing 
State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Association, 140 S.E.2d 457, 462 
(W. Va. 1965); Schulman v. Washington Hospital Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 63 (D.D.C. 
1963); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hospital, Inc., 123 S.E.2d 533, 539 (Va. 
1962); Manczur v. Southside Hospital, 183 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961 (1959); and Levin v. 
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore City, 46 A.2d 298, 301 (Md. 1946)). 
56 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312-13. 
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the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits 
those laws confer,” necessitating a balancing of burdens against benefits 
to determine whether the burden on abortion access is “undue”—that 
is, unjustified by its benefits.57 
The Court reviewed the extensive evidence presented in the trial 
court regarding the safety benefits of each law—which were found to be 
minimal or nonexistent58—and the corresponding burden on abortion 
access—which, in this case, meant the closure of about thirty-two of 
Texas’s forty abortion clinics, requiring women in some parts of the state 
to travel over 400 miles roundtrip to obtain an abortion.59 Balancing the 
negligible safety benefits against the significant burdens on abortion 
access, the Court held that the Texas regulations amounted to an “undue 
burden” on abortion and were therefore unconstitutional under the 
framework set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.60 Crucially, Whole 
Woman’s Health explained that courts must consider the actual, on-the-
ground burdens imposed by a particular abortion restriction and weigh 
them against any benefits that the law would bring.61 If the actual, record-
supported benefits of the law were outweighed by such real-life costs, 
the Court explained, the law’s burden would be “undue.”62 Following its 
own advice, the Court in Whole Woman’s Health demonstrated 
attentiveness to the particular burdens faced by rural women and to the 
problems of requiring women to seek care in overcrowded clinics due to 
increased demand for services.63  
While litigation over facility regulations continued to play out in 
lower courts under the Whole Woman’s Health balancing test, a differently 
composed Supreme Court had an opportunity to reconsider that test just 
four years later. In June Medical Services v. Russo, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Louisiana law requiring admitting privileges for abortion 
providers—a law that was “substantially identical” to the Texas law it 
held unconstitutional in Whole Woman’s Health.64 The law, if allowed to go 
into effect, would have closed two of Louisiana’s three abortion clinics 
 
57 Id. at 2309-10. 
58 Id. at 2311-12, 2315-16. 
59 Id. at 2301-02. 
60 Id. at 2300.  
61 Id. at 2309. 
62 Id. at 2313, 2318. 
63 Id. at 2302, 2318. 
64 June Med. Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020) (plurality op.). 
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and left it with only one abortion-providing physician in the state.65 
However, because Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote in the 
Whole Woman’s Health majority, had been replaced by the more 
conservative Justice Kavanaugh, only four Justices from that original 
coalition remained on the Court. Chief Justice Roberts, who had 
dissented in Whole Woman’s Health, nonetheless joined Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor in striking down the Louisiana law. In 
his separate concurrence to the four-Justice plurality opinion, Roberts 
asserted that “[t]he Louisiana law impose[d] a burden on access to 
abortion just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same 
reasons,” and therefore stare decisis required the Court to declare it 
unconstitutional.”66 At the same time, he placed the Whole Woman’s Health 
balancing test into doubt, insisting that “[n]othing about Casey suggested 
that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job 
for the courts.”67 Instead, Roberts insisted, courts should only look at the 
burden side of the equation—that is, they should only strike down a law 
if the burden it placed on abortion access was sufficiently substantial.68 
In the context of facility regulations, the decision whether to 
engage in balancing of benefits and burdens can be dispositive. If the 
court focuses only on how substantially a law burdens abortion access, 
without comparing that burden to the benefits the law was supposed to 
advance, then courts will be more likely to uphold restrictions that have 
little to no actual medical benefits but impose a less severe burden than 
those at issue in Whole Woman’s Health and June Medical Services, which 
threated to shutter the majority of clinics in the state. Thus, it is 
important for  courts considering facility regulations to determine the 
significance of Chief Justice Roberts’s separate opinion. Under the rule 
announced by the Supreme Court in Marks v. United States, “[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”69  
In the wake of June Medical, lower courts evaluating facility 
regulations immediately split on the proper test to apply under the Marks 
 
65 Id. at 2129. 
66 Id. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
67 Id. at 2136. 
68 Id. at 2138-39. 
69 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 
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rule. In American College of Obstetricians & Gyncologists v. FDA, a Maryland 
district court held that the balancing test survived June Medical, since the 
“common denominator” of the plurality and the concurring opinions 
was “that a ‘substantial obstacle’ based solely on consideration of 
burdens is sufficient to satisfy the undue burden standard, [but] not that it 
is necessary.”70 By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Hopkins v. Jegley ordered 
the lower court to reconsider its decision to enjoin a series of Arkansas 
abortion restrictions under the Whole Woman’s Health balancing test, 
holding that June Medical Services had eliminated that test and required 




Not all facility regulations take the form of admitting privileges 
requirements, however; some have directly attempted to control the 
places where abortion clinics may locate. An Alabama law passed in 2017 
limited the places within a state where abortion clinics were permitted to 
locate, prohibiting them to exist within 2,000 feet of a public elementary 
school.72 Deploying the Whole Woman’s Health balancing test, a federal 
 
70 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 
No. CV TDC-20-1320, 2020 WL 3960625, at *16 (D. Md. July 13, 2020). 
71 Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2020). Even prior to June Medical, 
courts sometimes upheld the constitutionality of TRAP laws. For example, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas enjoined a law requiring physicians 
that provide medication-only abortions to have a relationship with a physician who 
can admit patients to a hospital—a law that was similar in both purpose and effect to 
the Texas admitting privileges requirement struck down in Whole Woman’s Health.71 In 
fact, the district court applied the same balancing of benefits and burdens that the 
Court mandated in Whole Woman’s Health. Planned Parenthood Ark. & E. Okla. v. 
Jegley, No. 4:15-cv-00784-KGB, 2016 WL 6211310, at *20 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 2016). 
The district court had found that this restriction would leave Arkansas with only one 
abortion clinic, and medication-only abortion would become entirely unavailable in 
the state. Id. Nonetheless, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the trial court’s 
evaluation of the burdens on women was not specific enough, as there was 
insufficient evidence in the record of the number of women who would face an 
obstacle in accessing medication abortion in Arkansas. Planned Parenthood of 
Arkansas & E. Oklahoma v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 959-60 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2573 (2018). 
72 ALA. CODE § 22-21-35. Similarly, a city in Tennessee passed a zoning restriction 
that had the effect of preventing any abortion clinic from locating within the city 
limits. FemHealth USA, Inc. v. City of Mount Juliet, No. 3:19-CV-01141, 2020 WL 
2098234, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 1, 2020). The case was settled after a district court 
held the provision was likely unconstitutional. Andy Humbles, Mt. Juliet to Pay $225K 
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district court held that law to constitute an undue burden.73 Although 
supposedly adopted to “minimize[e] disturbance in the educational 
environment” (from protestors outside the clinics) and to “support[] a 
parent’s right to control his or her children’s exposure to the subject of 
abortion,” the court found that these interests were insufficient to justify 
the law’s burdens.74 There was no evidence of any disruption of the 
nearby schools and minimal evidence of injury to parents’ interests, and 
the law would force the closure of two clinics in two major Alabama 
cities, which provided 70% of abortions in the state.75 This would greatly 
increase delays and travel distances for many women in the state, and 
abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy would become complete 
unavailable in Alabama.76  
Laws regulating particular abortion methods are less obvious 
examples of facility regulation. Several states have adopted laws banning 
a particular method of abortion, known as dilation and evacuation, or 
“D&E.”77 This procedure is not only the most common method of 
second-trimester abortion, it is also the only procedure that can be 
performed in a freestanding clinic setting after approximately thirteen to 
sixteen weeks of pregnancy. Although other methods of abortion at this 
stage of pregnancy do exist, those procedures cannot generally be 
performed in a clinic setting, as opposed to a hospital.78 And since 
hospitals do not perform a significant number of abortions as compared 
 
in Abortion Lawsuit Settlement; ‘A Bitter Pill to Swallow,’ City Attorney Says, TENNESSEAN 
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/local/wilson/mt-
juliet/2020/09/15/mt-juliet-pay-225-k-abortion-settlement-carafem-
clinic/5802117002/. Such laws may be part of a still relatively marginal movement to 
create “sanctuary cities” where abortion is not permitted. See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, The 
Wall Some Texans Want to Build Against Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (March 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/us/politics/texas-abortion-sanctuary-
cities.html. 
73 West Alabama Women’s Ctr., 299 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 2017).  
74 Id. at 1253. 
75 Id. at 1254-58, 64. 
76 Id. at 1261-64. 
77 Alan Guttmacher Inst., Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First 
Trimester (Aug.1, 2019),  https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/bans-
specific-abortion-methods-used-after-first-trimester. 
78 See, e.g., W. Alabama Women's Ctr. v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310, 1321 (11th Cir. 
2018).  
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to clinics,79 a law outlawing a particular method of abortion like D&E 
can in reality function as a total ban on abortions after a particular stage 
of pregnancy. Since D&E is the only practicable method of abortion in 
clinics after a particular stage of pregnancy, and only freestanding clinics 
provide abortions in most states (for all intents and purposes), the only 
abortions available after a particular point in pregnancy are D&E 
abortions. Thus, even regulation of the methods of abortion are, 
ultimately, also facility regulations. 
Similarly, some states have imposed spatial limitations on 
telemedicine for the medication-only method of abortion.80 Currently, 
nineteen states require the provider of abortion medication to be in the 
physical presence of the woman receiving the drug, although many of 
those states have more relaxed standards for telemedicine outside the 
abortion context.81 Only one such law has been held unconstitutional 
outside the context of the coronavirus pandemic.82 As in the other cases 
discussed above, the court in that case weighed the negligible-to-
nonexistent health and safety benefits of the law against the severe 
reduction in abortion access caused by potentially extreme travel 
distances in the state, coupled with a 24-hour waiting period law.83 
 
B. Implications of Facility Regulations 
 
In order to understand the current impact of facility regulations 
on abortion availability and on abortion jurisprudence more generally, it 
is important to understand how abortion services are distributed in the 
 
79 See, e.g., id. (stating that “99.6% of abortions in Alabama occur in outpatient 
clinics”); Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 23 
FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 246, 246 (1991); infra text accompanying notes ___. 
80 See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 653—13.10; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-14-12d 
(West). 
81 Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Laws and Policies: Medication Abortion, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medication-abortion (Oct. 1, 
2018); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 
252, 269 (Iowa 2015). 
82 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 865 N.W.2d at 269; see Guttmacher Inst., 
Medication Abortion (indicating that eighteen states ban telemedicine for abortion, but 
only one such law has been enjoined), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/medication-abortion. In Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecol v. FDA, a 
Maryland district court blocked enforcement of certain restrictions on the provision 
of medication abortion drugs by mail for the duration of the pandemic. No. CV 
TDC-20-1320, 2020 WL 3960625, at *1 (D. Md. July 13, 2020). 
83 Id. at 265-69. 
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U.S., and why they are distributed in this way. Approximately 95% of 
abortions are performed in freestanding clinics; only 5% are performed 
in hospitals or physicians’ offices.84 This geographical fact is not a mere 
historical accident; rather, it arose from an intentional decision by 
abortion-rights activists in the era leading up to Roe to prioritize provision 
of abortion services in non-hospital settings, with the goal of making 
abortion services more accessible and less expensive.85 Clinics, which 
were visibly identified as women’s health care providers, could provide 
abortions much less expensively than hospitals—much in the same way 
that freestanding birth control clinics increased access to contraception 
for lower-income women who were not able to obtain it discreetly from 
private physicians.86  
Still, there was an initial expectation among abortion advocates 
that hospitals would continue to provide abortions and fill any gaps that 
clinics could not. This expectation turned out to be incorrect. In the year 
Roe was decided, about 18% (1064 of 6000) non-Catholic hospitals in the 
U.S. offered abortions; by 1981, that percentage shrank significantly, to 
approximately 6%.87 Whereas about half of all abortions were performed 
in hospitals in 1973, by 1980 that figure was only 22%. As noted above, 
the percentage of abortions performed in hospitals today is almost 
negligible. 
There are likely several reasons for the change. Many insurers do 
not provide coverage for abortion, and abortion cannot be subsidized by 
federal Medicaid funds.88 However, it appears that hospital policies, 
 
84 Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability In the United 
States, 2014, 49 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 17, 20 (2017). Most 
nonhospital abortions are performed in specialized abortion clinics (59%), but a 
substantial proportion (36%) are performed in clinics that may also provide other 
services, such as family planning. Id. 
85 David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 
ALB. L. REV. 833, 838 (1999). The free-standing clinic model is also discussed in 
DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 408-09, 456-57 (1994). For a general discussion of how 
abortion services were distributed in the years immediately before and after Roe, see 
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 189-201 (2d ed. 2008). 
86 Garrow, Abortion, supra note 85, at 834-35; 838. 
87 FAYE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 55 (1998). 
88 Alan Guttmacher Inst., Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/restricting-insurance-coverage-
abortion; see also Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United 
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driven by hostility on the part of hospital personnel, together with 
hospital boards’ concerns about being seen as “abortion mills,” drove 
hospitals to simply outsource this service in most circumstances. Indeed, 
one study from 1980 found that physicians’ negative attitudes toward 
abortion were the primary driver of hospital policies in this area.89   
These decisions about the provision of abortion services have 
had several significant long-term doctrinal and on-the-ground effects.  
For one thing, it has led to the spatial and doctrinal isolation of abortion 
from health care more generally. Just as one abortion-rights proponent, 
Dr. Robert Hall, predicted in the early 1970s, the relegation of abortion 
provision to clinics essentially let “organized medicine” off the hook for 
providing those services.90 This led to the increased isolation of abortion 
providers, many of whose practices primarily or exclusive consisted of 
abortion provision.91 It also made it easier to reduce abortion availability 
just by regulating the sorts of freestanding clinics where most abortions 
were performed, because they are easily singled out in statutory and 
regulatory frameworks.  
In many states, facility regulations have severely affected the 
accessibility of abortion services. Most obviously, as explained above in 
Part II.A., onerous facility regulations can reduce the availability of 
abortion services because they can be too expensive or logistically 
impossible to comply with, especially since they require clinics to, in 
essence, gain the approval or at least the acquiescence of private parties 
(hospitals or non-abortion-providing physicians) in order to stay in 
operation.92 Facility regulations have thus likely resulted in a significant 
reduction in abortion access in many states. 
 
States, 23 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 246, 246 (1991) (“In the United States, abortion 
services have been concentrated in clinics, initially because hospitals in many areas 
chose not to perform abortions when the procedure become legal in the early 1970s, 
and more recently because hospitals have been moving away from offering minor 
surgery in general.”). 
89 Constance A. Nathanson & Marshall H. Becker, Obstetricians’ Attitudes and Hospital 
Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 26, 26 (1980); see also ROSENBERG, supra 
note 85, at 189-95. 
90 Garrow, Abortion, supra note 85, at 839. 
91 Id.  This point may be driven home by a comparative observation. In Canada, 
where legislative hostility to abortion is not as high as in the U.S., hospital abortions 
are more common. See generally Wendy V. Norman, et al., Abortion Health Services in 
Canada: Results of a National Survey, 62 CANADIAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN e209 (2016). 
92 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302–03 (2016), as revised 
(June 27, 2016) (repeating the district court’s findings that the cost complying with the 
Texas surgical-center requirement for existing abortion clinics would be 
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Importantly, these effects are not evenly distributed. Hospitals 
are more likely to be found in urban areas, as are abortion clinics. This 
state of affairs makes it more difficult for clinics to operate in rural 
settings and for rural women, many of whom are also poor, to access 
abortion.93 Indeed, one recent study documents “substantial and 
persistent spatial disparities in access to abortion” in the U.S., such that 
many women—those in urban areas—live relatively short distances from 
an abortion provider, but a substantial minority—rural women—may 
live over fifty or even one hundred miles from any provider.94 As 
discussed in more detail in Part III, the impact is so extreme in some 
cases that it threatens to leave entire states without a single abortion 
provider and to force women to cross state lines in order to access 
services. Moreover, this spatial inequality aggravates other forms of 
inequality, such as socioeconomic inequality, which makes travel 
substantially more difficult for poor women, who are less likely to be able 
to afford child care, time off work, and other expenses such as overnight 
lodging that may be necessitated by state laws requiring two trips to an 
abortion provider. 
More broadly, facility regulations mean that the facts on the 
ground relevant to the burden imposed by particular abortion 
restrictions—which courts have found relevant to determining their 
constitutionality in the wake of Whole Woman’s Health—will differ from 
state to state and within a particular state.95 The admitting-privileges cases 
 
approximately 1-1.5 million dollars or more; that some clinics would be altogether 
unable to comply due to the constraints of the physical size of their locations; and 
that constructing a new, compliant clinic would likely cost 3 million dollars or more). 
93 Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, supra note 13, at 360-61. At the same time, 
this uneven geographical distribution of abortion services has led some to suggest that 
abortion providers “target” urban poor and minority neighborhoods. See, e.g. 
https://www.lifeissues.org/2017/02/investigation-planned-parenthood-speeds-
targeting-minorities/. 
94 Jonathan M. Bearak, Kristen Lagasse Burke & Rachel K. Jones, Disparities and 
Change over Time in Distance Women Would Need to Travel to Have an Abortion in the USA: 
A Spatial Analysis, 2 LANCET PUBLIC HEALTH e493, e495, e499 (2017). Note that, 
although almost all of the states in which travel distances increased also adopted 
abortion restrictions and suffered declines in the number of clinics, id. at e499, the 
study did not examine causal factors; it therefore does not confirm that restrictive 
abortion laws cause such access issues. 
95 See Mary Ziegler, Rethinking an Undue Burden: Whole Woman's Health's New Approach 
to Fundamental Rights, 85 TENN. L. REV. 461, 491 (2018) (“Whole Woman's 
Health announces a test centered much more on the facts of how a law affects the 
exercise of a right in the real world.”); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702574
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from the Eighth Circuit and Fifth Circuit, discussed above, present one 
example of how facts on the ground can make a meaningful difference 
in courts’ adjudication of nearly identical laws.96 As another example, in 
a case challenging restrictions on the provision of medication abortion, 
advocates note that more than half of all women in Maine, which is the 
most rural state in the U.S.—live in counties without surgical abortion 
providers—suggesting that that this fact might weigh against the 
constitutionality of restrictions that would pass muster in another state.97 
Thus, the place- and context-sensitive attention to the realities of 
abortion access suggested by Whole Woman’s Health could help ensure that 
the abortion right is meaningfully available, rather than just an 
abstraction. But at the same time, it ensures significant geographic 
variation in both the real scope of the constitutional right to privacy and 
in how Supreme Court doctrine is understood and applied.  
Beyond these impacts on abortion access at both the state and 
sub-state level, facility regulation has had far-reaching effects on abortion 
rights doctrine itself. Though a product of the state’s power to regulate 
medicine, facility regulation has ironically both resulted from and 
reinforced the legal and cultural isolation of abortion from health care in 
general. For example, it has likely helped to stigmatize abortion and 
abortion providers—thus making it easier to regulate abortion in ways 
that do not affect other, similarly situated medical services and reducing 
the likelihood that a political coalition of physicians and health care 
professionals would rally behind abortion providers when they are so 
targeted.98 By continuing to ensure that abortion services are primarily 
 
Difference A Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman's 
Health, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 149, 161-62 (2016) (“In identifying the burdens 
imposed by the Texas law, the Court describes how enforcing the law would 
transform women's experience of abortion, and treats these changes in the conditions 
of access as constitutionally cognizable harms to women”); see also Lisa R. Pruitt, 
Toward A Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 421, 458 (2007). 
96 Supra text accompanying notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark 
not defined..  
97 Complaint, Jenkins v. Almay, paras. 111-13 (D. Me. Sept. 20, 2017) (citing U.S. 
Census Bureau, Maine: 2010 Population and Housing Unit Counts 2 (2010), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/cen2010/cph-2-21.pdf; Press Release, 
U.S. Census Bureau, Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation , Census 
Bureau Reports (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html). 
98 Perhaps this differential form of regulation has also contributed to the unique and 
somewhat sui generis constitutional jurisprudence surrounding abortion, with its unique 
doctrinal tests and terminology. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
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provided in specialized clinics outside of mainstream medical spaces, it 
has made abortion clinics and abortion doctors easier to target for 
harassment and violence by anti-abortion activists.99 This targeting in 
turn creates an additional barrier and burden, on top of the problem of 
travel distance, for women seeking access to abortion services. 
At the same time, legal regulation of abortion-providing facilities 
entrenches their legal designation as medical or even “surgical” spaces, 
to the exclusion of other sites where abortions may take place.100 Facility 
regulations channel the performance of surgical abortions and even 
medication abortions into abortion clinics, even though the latter, at 
least, can be safely performed in other settings such as the woman’s 
home.101 Certainly, there is no need for medication abortions to be 
performed in ambulatory surgical centers. In fact, even most so-called 
“surgical” first-trimester abortions are arguably not even surgical 
procedures, since they do not require cutting the skin and do not involve 
a sterile opening.102 Indeed, the border between what is health care and 
what is something else—self-care, perhaps—is not at all an obvious or 
natural one. Long before abortion became heavily regulated and 
 
U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (describing Roe as sui generis, in the context of a discussion of 
substantive due process doctrine); B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and the Politics of 
Reproductive Health Care, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 103, 103–04 (2016). 
99 See generally DAVID S. COHEN & KRYSTEN CONNON, LIVING IN THE CROSSHAIRS: 
THE UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM 6-7 (2015) (discussing 
“targeted harassment” of abortion providers and noting that harassment of clinic 
workers is an inexpensive and efficient way for anti-abortion activists to increase the 
costs of providing abortion services). 
100 In the words of Richard Ford, “the habit of organizing the administration of policy 
in any particular way is a choice. The practice of organizing activities as first and 
foremost occurring in a place defined by its borders is a habit, not a necessity.” 
Richard Thompson Ford, Law and Borders, 64 ALA. L. REV. 123, 128 (2012). 
101 Elizabeth G. Raymond, et al., Sixteen Years of Overregulation: Time to Unburden 
Mifeprex, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 790, 792 (2017); Yael Swica, et al., Acceptability of 
Home Use of Mifepristone for Medical Abortion, 88 CONTRACEPTION 122, 125 (2013). 
Professor Yvonne Lindgren argues that prohibiting medication abortion in the home 
violates the right to privacy. Yvonne Lindgren, The Doctor Requirement: Griswold, 
Privacy, and At-Home Reproductive Care, 32 CONST. COMM. 341 (2017).  
102 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016) 
(“[A]bortions typically involve either the administration of medicines or procedures 
performed through the natural opening of the birth canal, which is itself not sterile.”). 
In fact, some courts have begun using the term “procedural abortion” rather than 
“surgical abortion,” so as to emphasize that no actual surgery is involved. See, e.g., 
Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 917 (6th Cir. 2020); In re Abbott, 954 
F.3d 772, 781 n.15 (5th Cir. 2020). 
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medicalized, it was something women did on their own, with limited or 
no medical intervention;103 one movement currently seeks to re-discover 
and vindicate the pre-Roe, pre-modern right of women to manage their 
own pregnancy terminations without fear of state criminal 
intervention.104 Yet, the designation of abortion clinics as surgical spaces 
both minimizes access and increases state control over the procedure by 
entrenching its designation as a surgical procedure, subject to the state’s 
police power to regulate the practice of medicine. 
The profound but under-appreciated way in which facility 
regulation shapes the abortion landscape reflects a deeper causal 
relationship between spatial regulation and moral regulation by the state. 
As the geographer Margo Huxley has explained, the governmental 
production and regulation of physical spaces performs numerous 
functions; such regulation not only controls or confines conduct, but also 
produces a particular “social and moral order.”105 Spatial regulation to 
promote the interests of health and safety, in particular, is often tied to 
notions of “moral and spiritual health” as well: consider the longstanding 
association of “slums” with both unhealthy conditions and amorality.106 
“If these diseased areas and their inhabitants can be cured and 
improved,” the logic goes, “the body of the city, the social body, and the 
proper relations between its parts and processes will be restored to 
normal, healthy equilibrium.”107  
A similar logic seems to have driven the shift to widespread 
facility regulation with respect to abortion: legislatures seized on the 
 
103 For a fascinating history, see Monica E. Eppinger, The Health Exception, 17 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 665, 683-87 (2016). 
104 SIA Legal Team, Roe’s Unfinished Promise: Decriminalizing Abortion Once and for All 
(2017), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/aa251a_66c348049b5c4871a5c867d09cf9a994.pdf. 
Similarly, researchers have begun to study health care delivery outside of traditional 
health care settings, such as by training barbers to check blood pressure and make 
referrals or even provide prescription medications—both in order in increase access 
and to capitalize on the pre-existing relationship of trust—to great positive effect. 
Aaron E. Carroll, What Barbershops Can Teach About Delivering Health Care, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/upshot/what-barbershops-
can-teach-about-delivering-health-care.html.  
105 Margo Huxley, Geographies of Governmentality, in SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: 
FOUCAULT AND GEOGRAPHY 137, 144 (Stuart Elden & Jeremy W. Crampton, eds. 
2007). Huxley’s work explicitly draws upon and applies that of French historian and 
philosopher Michel Foucault. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 145. 
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horrendous conditions at the clinics operated by one criminal and deeply 
unscrupulous abortion provider, Kermit Gosnell, as a reason for 
regulating abortion-providing facilities.108 There is thus a “causal logic” 
that endows spatial regulation with a moral valence. The moral goal is 
also not to make abortion safer—a goal that the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated to be pretextual—but rather to advance the social and 
moral aim of eliminating the practice of abortion within the state, as 
evidenced by Governors’ statements upon signing the laws that focus 
not upon health and safety, but rather upon the impact on availability of 
abortion services in the state.109 Yet spatial facility regulations effectively 
conceal the moral agenda behind the legislation by providing a health and 
safety rationale for the regulation. In similar fashion, the physical 
isolation of abortion clinics has caused, or aggravated, the legal and social 
isolation of abortion from health care more generally. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, facility regulations 
conceal the role of the state in burdening abortion rights. There seems 
to be a causal relationship between the existence of onerous facility 
regulations and reduced abortion access, but the line of causality is not 
always obvious.110 Instead, a number of factors play undetermined roles 
in aggravating the vulnerability of clinics to closure in the face of such 
regulations.111 The reluctance of third-party hospitals to grant clinics the 
arrangements they require in order operate appears to be a factor external 
to state regulation, but it is a reality that legislators exploit as part of an 
intentional strategy to reduce abortion access. The legal rule, which does 
not appear to be aimed at advancing moral aims (such as reducing 
abortions), relies upon realities on the ground to achieve precisely those 
goals. Those realities include the concentration of hospitals in urban 
areas; the refusal of most hospitals to perform abortions, due in part to 
legal rules or industry norms preventing insurance coverage for the 
procedure in most circumstances; the widespread religious affiliation of 
 
108 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2343-44 (2016), as revised 
(June 27, 2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting Texas’s facility regulation was “was one 
of many enacted by States in the wake of the Kermit Gosnell scandal”); Planned 
Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 923–24 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(Manion, J., dissenting) (describing Gosnell’s “shop of horrors” as the impetus for 
Wisconsin’s admitting privileges requirement).  
109 See infra text accompanying notes 118-121. 
110 See supra note 94. 
111 See Michelle L. McGowan, Alison H. Norris & Danielle Bessett, Care Churn—Why 
Keeping Clinic Doors Open Isn’t Enough to Ensure Access to Abortion, 383 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 508 (2020). 
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hospitals; and the isolation of freestanding abortion providers from other 
health care providers. These realities are not generally taken into account 
when courts analyze the constitutionality of facility regulations, 
however—instead, they are seen as neutral, pre-existing, states of affairs 
unrelated to the legislation itself. For example, in one case, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the extensive difficulties 
experienced by one Ohio clinic in attempting to obtain a legally required 
transfer agreement with a local hospital.112 One hospital simply declined 
to enter into such an agreement, and the other rescinded an agreement 
after objections from a member of the hospital’s board who opposed 
abortion.113 Yet the court found that the facility regulation was a “facially 
neutral” regulation and had no invalid purpose; these facts did not 
ultimately play a role in the court’s analysis, which focused solely on the 
distance women would have to travel to obtain an abortion if the clinic 
were to shut down.114  
Some courts and scholars have begun to recognize, however, that 
the geographical disparities that result from facility regulation are a direct 
result of state policies. In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court recognized for 
the first time the disproportionate impact of facility regulations on poor 
and rural women and used this fact as a reason in support of its 
decision.115 Similarly, scholars have described how physical location—
one’s neighborhood or zip code—functions as powerful predictor of life 
expectancy and determinant of health.116 Sociologist Carolette Norwood 
has explicitly connected this reality to the history of segregation and 
official discrimination, which now manifest as  “structural” violence—
violence in the form of severe inequality in access to goods and services 
arising from underlying social and political arrangements that 
 
112 Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 599-600 (6th Cir. 2006). 
113 Id. at 599 & n.3. 
114 Id. at 607. 
115 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 (2016), as revised 
(June 27, 2016). 
116 See, e.g., Virginia Commonwealth University Center on Society and Health, Mapping 
Life Expectancy, https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/work/the-projects/mapping-life-
expectancy.html; Garth Graham, MaryLynn Ostrowski & Alyse Sabina, Defeating the 
ZIP Code Health Paradigm: Data, Technology, and Collaboration Are Key, Health 
Affairs Blog (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150806.049730/full/. 
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disadvantage poorer citizens—and “spatial violence”—violence that is 
concentrated in a particular geographical space.117 
III. Border Control: Zoning Out Abortion and 
Creating Reproductive Refugees 
 
Spatial regulation of abortion extends beyond facility regulation. 
At times, abortion regulations drastically affect access to abortion within 
an entire state or even reach beyond state or national borders. First, 
facility regulations that close abortion clinics on a massive scale have 
threatened to leave entire states without an abortion provider. These laws 
appear to be the result of intentional efforts to make some states 
“abortion-free.” Second, laws have been proposed or passed that 
regulate the ability of women under the age of eighteen to access abortion 
outside the borders of their state. Finally, the federal Government has 
taken steps to regulate the access of undocumented minors to abortion 
in the U.S. after crossing the Southern border. As discussed below, all of 
these instances of abortion-related “border control” highlight the 
relationship between liberty and citizenship and again demonstrate the 
effectiveness of spatial regulation in concealing the role of the state in 
enforcing or aggravating various forms of inequality. 
 
A. The Relationship Between Spatial Abortion Restrictions and State and 
National Borders 
 
As noted above, the ability to police borders is a fundamental 
attribute of sovereignty, just as the ability to travel and cross borders 
freely is a fundamental attribute of liberty, or self-sovereignty. For this 
reason, it should come as no surprise that state and national borders take 
on special significance in the struggle over the control of women’s 
reproductive autonomy. This significance has manifested in various 
ways. 
In some states, including Mississippi, Missouri, and Kentucky, 
facility regulations have come to the verge of shutting down all abortion 
clinics in the entire state—a result that, in each state, seemed to be the 
 
117 Carolette R. Norwood, Mapping the Intersections of Violence on Black Women’s Sexual 
Health within the Jim Crow Geographies of Cincinnati Neighborhoods, 39 FRONTIERS 97, 97-
98 (2018). 
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very purpose of the regulations. Indeed, in Mississippi, elected officials 
clearly expressed their specific intent to this effect. Governor Phil Bryant, 
on vowing to sign a bill requiring abortion providers to have admitting 
privileges at a local hospital, stated, “I will continue to work to make 
Mississippi abortion-free.”118 The lieutenant governor of that state 
similarly quipped, shortly after the law’s passage, that it “should 
effectively close the only abortion clinic in Mississippi.”119 Individual 
legislators made comments to the same effect.120 When Texas passed S.B. 
5—the facility regulation challenged in Whole Woman’s Health—the state’s 
lieutenant governor posted the following tweet, which made visible the 




118 Complaint, Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, ¶ 19, No. 3:12-cv-00436 
(filed June 27, 2012) (quoting Phil West, Mississippi Senate Passes Abortion Regulation Bill, 
The Commercial Appeal, April 4, 2012). 
119 Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Joe Sutton & Tom Watkins, Mississippi Legislature Tightens 
Restrictions on Abortion Providers, CNN Politics (April 4, 2012).  
120 Id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
121 David Dewhurst (@DavidHDewhurst), Twitter (June 19, 2013, 7:41 AM), 
https://twitter.com/davidhdewhurst/status/347363442497302528?lang=en. 
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In the case of Kentucky, while there were no such direct remarks, a 
pattern of arbitrary enforcement of the state’s facility regulations strongly 
suggested a desire to shut down the state’s last remaining abortion 
clinic.122  
Thus, in some cases, states have attempted to force any women 
seeking abortion access to leave the state, creating “a patchwork system 
where constitutional rights are available in some states but not others,”123 
and making women into “reproductive refugees.”124 But courts have so 
far held that a regulation that would force the closure of a state’s last 
abortion clinic constitutes an unconstitutional undue burden, at least 
when a sufficient health or safety-related justification is lacking.125  
Other regulations have been passed or proposed that regulate 
extraterritorial access to abortion. In several successive sessions of 
Congress, for example, a bill has been proposed that would criminalize 
taking a minor across state lines to have an abortion and avoid a parental 
consent or parental notice requirement in the minor’s home state. The 
proposed Child Custody Protection Act (“CCPA”), which has been 
introduced eight times since 1998, would criminalize the act of taking a 
minor across state lines for an abortion in order to avoid a parental-
notice or parental-consent requirement in the minor’s home state.126 The 
Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act (“CIANA”), which has been 
introduced five times since 2006, would add a requirement that abortion 
providers notify the parents of all minors seeking abortions unless the 
minor has not traveled from another state and the abortion is being 
 
122 EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Glisson, No. 3:17-CV-00189-GNS, 2018 
WL 6444391, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2018) (describing how, despite a facility 
regulation being in place for 19 years without any problems, the state began suddenly 
declining to renew a clinic’s license for various technical reasons). 
123 JWHO, 760 F.3d at 455 (quoting district court opinion) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
124 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Melissa Murray, I. Glenn Cohen and B. 
Jessie Hill in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 2015 WL 
9601563 (U.S.), 18-21 (2015). 
125 EMW, 2018 WL 6444391, at *28; Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 
F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2014). 
126 S.32 113th Cong. (2013); see also H.R.3682, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R.1218, 106th 
Cong. (1999); S.661, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R.476, 107th Cong. (2002); S.403, 109th 
Cong. (2006); S.2543, 110th Cong. (2008); S.1179, 111th Cong. (2009); S.167, 112th 
Cong. (2011); S.32, 113th Cong. (2013).  
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provided in one of the twelve states that lack a parental involvement 
requirement.127 
Although neither of these federal laws has yet been enacted, 
several states have laws that appear to restrict minors’ travel for abortion. 
For example, a 2005 Missouri law creates a civil cause of action for 
helping a minor to obtain an abortion without parental or judicial 
consent, which would presumably affect adults assisting minors with 
inter- or even intrastate travel.128 This law has been upheld against 
challenges on First Amendment, Due Process, Commerce Clause, and 
right-to-travel grounds.129 Other states restrict the venue where minors 
can apply for a judicial bypass—for example, to their county of residence 
or an adjoining county.130 Read literally, such laws would mean that out-
of-state minors generally cannot seek a judicial bypass and therefore 
cannot get an abortion in the state without parental consent.131 
Finally, abortion restrictions have interacted even with national 
borders. In September 2017, an unaccompanied 17-year-old girl crossed 
the southern U.S. border into Texas, where she was taken into U.S. 
 
127 Both laws contain exceptions for minors who have already received judicial 
permission to bypass the parental-involvement requirement (a “judicial bypass”), and 
for medical emergencies. S.369, 113th Cong. (2013); see also H.R. 748, 109th Cong. 
(2006); S.403, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 1063, 100th Cong. (2007); H.R. 634, 111th 
Cong. (2009); H.R. 2299, 112th Cong. (2011); S.1241, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 732, 
113th Cong. (2013); S. 369, 113th Cong. (2013). For a discussion and defense of the 
CCPA and CIANA, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Transporting Minors for Immoral Purposes: 
The Case for the Child Custody Protection Act & the Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, 
16 HEALTH MATRIX 107 (2006). For a list of the states that currently have parental-
involvement requirements, see NARAL Pro-Choice America & NARAL Pro-Choice 
America Foundation, Who Decides?: The Status of Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United 
States 24 (26th ed. 2017), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/WhoDecides2017-DigitalEdition3.pdf. 
128 MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.250 (West); see also IND. CODE § 16–34–2–4.2(c). 
129 Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Mo. 2007) (holding 
the law constitutional). But see Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Comm'r, Indiana State Dep't of Health, 258 F. Supp. 3d 929, 952 (S.D. Ind. 2017) 
(issuing a preliminary injunction against a similar law in Indiana), aff’d, 937 F.3d 973 
(7th Cir. 2019). 
130 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114(a) (West); IND. CODE 35–1–58.5–2.5(b) 
(repealed). 
131 However, courts have often construed such venue restrictions not to limit the 
places where out-of-state minors can seek abortions, to avoid constitutional questions. 
Womancare of Orlando, Inc. v. Agwunobi, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 
2005); Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 
1142 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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custody and placed in a shelter run by the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR).132 There, the minor, described in the pleadings and cases as J.D. 
(for “Jane Doe”), learned she was pregnant, and she wished to terminate 
the pregnancy.133 She successfully followed the procedures prescribed by 
Texas law for obtaining an abortion without notifying her parents and, 
with the help of a guardian ad litem, was able to arrange for private 
financing and transportation for the procedure.134 Before she could 
obtain an abortion, however, ORR officials blocked J.D.’s travel to the 
clinic, telling her she could get the procedure only if she left ORR custody 
by being placed with a sponsor; alternately, if she did not want to be 
forced by U.S. officials to carry her pregnancy to term, she could agree 
to “voluntarily self-deport to her home country,” where abortion is not, 
however, legal.135 Thus, although as a “person” present within the U.S. 
J.D. unquestionably possessed a constitutional right to terminate her 
pregnancy while in the U.S.,136 the federal Government was able to assert 
arbitrary authority over her reproductive choices and bodily integrity 
simply by virtue of her geographic situation—her physical presence 
within ORR custody, which itself was a result of her having crossed a 
national border. The Government’s position was an assertion of 
complete authority—“an absolute veto”—over J.D.’s pregnancy, which 
could only be avoided by leaving the sovereign space controlled by the 
United States.137 And indeed, J.D. was not the only minor to be handled 
in this manner—her treatment reflected a general policy of the ORR with 
respect to unaccompanied minors; this policy has led to a class action 
suit to enjoin the practice.138 
 
B. Implications of Abortion Restrictions Affecting State and National Borders 
 
 
132 Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145, 151 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 925 F.3d 1291 
(D.C. Cir. 2019).  
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 U.S. CONST. AMDT. V. Neither the courts nor the United States Government 
disputed that J.D. possessed this constitutional right. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 
737 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett, J., concurring); Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145, 
162 n.5 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. J.D. v. Azar, 
925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
137 Garza, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 162. 
138 Id. at 150-51. 
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Abortion restrictions that interact with state and national borders 
have two major features. First, as with facility regulations, the legal 
mobilization of state and national borders in the context of abortion 
restrictions reinforces various forms of inequality while concealing the 
role of the state in creating and aggravating that inequality. A patchwork 
in which women in some states completely lack access to abortion creates 
a form of geographic inequality. Beyond geography, moreover, the 
inequality also plays out along the dimension of sex—since women are 
predominantly affected by the lack of access—but it also exploits and 
aggravates racial and economic inequality.139 Some affected individuals 
may face intersecting forms of disadvantage—like J.D., whose racial and 
national identity, resulting in her crossing the Southern U.S. border, and 
whose status as a minor made her particularly vulnerable to the raw 
exercise of sovereignty by the U.S. Government not only over its borders 
but also over her body. Another stark instance of intersecting 
disadvantage created at least in part by spatial abortion regulation is 
demonstrated by the plight of undocumented immigrant women in the 
Rio Grande Valley in Texas who largely lack access to abortion care, in 
part because they cannot travel outside that region within Texas to an 
abortion provider without encountering a Border Patrol checkpoint. 
Only one clinic remained in the sprawling, nearly 5,000-square-mile Rio 
Grande Valley region at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Whole Woman’s Health.140 Women living in that region would be forced to 
cross a national border (into Mexico) or a state border (into New Mexico) 
to access abortion services if the Supreme Court had allowed that final 
clinic to close. Moreover, even outside the border zone context, 
restrictions that increase travel burdens self-evidently fall harder on those 
women who are already financially insecure, since they can little afford 
 
139 Regarding the sex equality dimension, in considering the possibility of 
extraterritorial abortion regulation by states in a world without Roe, Susan Frelich 
Appleton speaks of “a gendered right to travel.” Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender, 
Abortion, and Travel After Roe’s End, 51 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 655, 683 (2007).  
140 Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 592-98 (5th Cir.), modified, 790 F.3d 
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016); Kate Huddleston, Border Checkpoints 
and Substantive Due Process: Abortion Rights in the Border Zone, 125 YALE L.J. 1744, 1748 
(2016); Madeline M. Gomez, Intersections at the Border: Immigration Enforcement, 
Reproductive Oppression, and the Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 84, 107-08 (2015). 
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the cost of travel itself—not to mention additional costs such as child 
care and lost wages.141  
While state borders are significant insofar as they delimit the 
physical domain in which a state law applies—such as an abortion facility 
regulation, or a prohibition on traveling to another state for a minor’s 
abortion—they are also treated as irrelevant and invisible. For example, 
in a challenge to Utah’s 24-hour waiting period for abortion, the district 
court breezily dismissed the notion that the state of Utah is different 
from the state of Pennsylvania in any legally relevant way—a necessary 
showing for the plaintiffs, since the Supreme Court had upheld 
Pennsylvania’s similar law.142 The court acknowledged that Utah is larger 
than Pennsylvania and has far fewer urban areas but rejected as a “red 
herring” the argument that “the waiting period’s burden is greater on 
rural women in Utah because they have farther to travel to get an 
abortion,” since “[t]his travel burden is not a factor of state law.”143 
Instead of recognizing the role of Utah law in burdening Utah women’s 
access to abortion, the court treated such geographical facts as merely 
natural, inevitable, and irrelevant to the law’s constitutionality. This mode 
of thinking appears to relieve the state of any responsibility for the law’s 
effects in Utah.  
Second, such abortion restrictions reinforce the importance of 
borders—state or national—in defining citizenship and controlling 
access to the benefits and protections thereof, even as states downplay 
the importance of those same borders, casting them as arbitrary and 
irrelevant. Thus, on the one hand, the state sometimes seeks to avoid 
boundary crossings, as in the case of the proposed CCPA and CIANA, 
as well as state laws that restrict travel and venue for minors seeking 
abortions. Extraterritorial criminalization of abortion—a possibility that 
can be contemplated in a post-Roe world—would similarly be aimed at 
keeping pregnant individuals from traveling outside the state for 
abortions.144 
 
141 Women who seek abortions are disproportionately poor, and they are 
disproportionately black and Latina. Jenna Jerman, Rachel K. Jones & Tsuyoshi 
Onda, Characteristics of Abortion Patients In 2014 and Changes Since 2008 5-7 (Alan 
Guttmacher Institute 2016), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/characteristics-us-
abortion-patients-2014.pdf. 
142 Utah Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1490 (D. Utah 1994). 
143 Utah Women’s Clinic, 844 F. Supp. at 1491 n.11. 
144 See supra note 13. 
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 On the other hand, states sometimes seek to encourage or even 
force border crossings. For example, the federal government told J.D. 
that she could not exercise her right to access abortion within the 
boundaries of the United States but could choose to “self deport.” Or, 
assuming a kind of “not in my backyard” posture, states have 
occasionally asserted as a defense to an undue-burden claim based on a 
dramatic reduction in abortion access that women can simply travel to 
adjoining states to access abortion, and that the clinics in those other 
states may even be closer to them than the in-state clinic or clinics in 
danger of closing.145 This argument suggests that state borders are 
meaningless and arbitrary—that people can cross them at will, and that 
borders have no special significance for the exercise of constitutional 
rights, while at the same time states claim that their abortion facility 
regulations are vital to protecting the health and safety of the citizens 
within their borders.146  
Generally, courts have rejected this defense, insisting that “state 
lines do matter,”147 and citing the 1938 U.S. Supreme Court case Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada148 for the proposition that “a state cannot lean on 
its sovereign neighbors to provide protection of its citizens’ federal 
constitutional rights.”149 Gaines was a case about racial equality. It 
involved a challenge to Missouri’s policy of denying black students 
admission to its state-sponsored law school, the University of Missouri, 
but paying for them to attend an out-of-state school that would accept 
them.150 Noting that “the obligation of the State to give the protection of 
equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within 
its own jurisdiction” and that “[t]hat obligation is imposed by the 
 
145 This claim was made in JWHO, 760 F.3d at 455; EMW, 2018 WL 6444391, at *25 
(“Contending that the regulations do not impose an unconstitutional burden on a 
woman's access to abortion, Defendants point to the availability of abortion facilities 
in other states.”); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 918 (7th 
Cir. 2015); and Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 596 (5th Cir. 2015). 
146 A related argument showing the arbitrary nature of state borders in abortion 
regulations is that laws that apply only in a single state, such as heightened informed 
consent requirements, may have “spillover” effects into other states, such as 
encouraging doctors to adopt those informed consent requirements even where they 
are not statutorily required to do so, in order to avoid civil lawsuits from patients. 
Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. 
L.J. 1, 6 (2016). 
147 JWHO, 760 F.3d at 455. 
148 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
149 JWHO, 760 F.3d at 457; Schimel at 919; EMW at *25. 
150 Gaines, 305 U.S. at 342. 
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Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities,—each 
responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons 
within its borders,” the Court held the Missouri policy to be an 
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause.151 Indeed, the 
Court implied that this holding derived not just from the 14th 
Amendment, but federalism itself:  
 
It is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by 
one State upon another, and no State can be excused from 
performance by what another State may do or fail to do. 
That separate responsibility of each State within its own 
sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained under our 
dual system.152 
 
Thus, the court in Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier rejected 
Mississippi’s attempt to enforce a facility regulation that would shut 
down the state’s last remaining abortion clinic, emphasizing the 
importance of state borders to the state’s obligation to ensure citizens 
can exercise their constitutional rights.153 At the same time, the dissenting 
judge in that case questioned whether “the [C]linic’s closure would result 
directly from [the challenged law], as opposed to the independent 
decisions of local hospitals—non-state actors.”154 
This apparent contradiction—that state policies regulating 
abortion with respect to state and national borders alternately seeks to 
keep people who seek abortions within the state, and to kick them out, 
simultaneously reinforcing and minimizing the importance of those 
borders themselves—simply highlights the fact that the ability to control 
the borders and their implications is more important than whether 
borders are used to include or to exclude. The border itself as mobilized 
as a tool of control. As noted above, a fundamental and ancient 
characteristic of sovereignty is the ability to exercise power over 
individuals within a set of borders.155 In the immigration context, Ayelet 
Schachar has referred to “the shifting border” of regulation, meaning 
 
151Gaines, 305 U.S. at 350. 
152 Id. 
153 JWHO, 760 F.3d at 457-58. 
154 Id. at 461. 
155 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186 (1977) (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within its territory.”). 
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that the line triggering enforcement of legal rules is movable and 
manipulable—“selectively utilized by…regulators to regain control over 
their crucial realm of responsibility, to determine who[m] to permit to 
enter, who[m] to remove, and who[m] to keep at bay.”156 And going a 
step further, geographer Mathew Coleman explains that what is really at 
issue is “social control” rather than “territorial control.”157 Borders in 
abortion regulation, like in immigration law, function more as a means 
of drawing distinctions among people on the bases of race, ethnicity, 
poverty, and other social characteristics, than as juridical boundaries.  
IV.  Spatial Regulation of  Pregnant Bodies 
Though less obvious in their relationship to borders, space, and 
geography than laws regulating abortion facilities and increasing travel 
burdens for women, another category of abortion restrictions may also 
be considered under the general rubric of spatial regulation. In this 
category are laws that regulate the internal geography of women’s 
bodies.158 These include laws that regulate the procedure sometimes 
referred to as “partial-birth abortion,” as well as forced ultrasound 
requirements, which often require doctors not only to show women an 
ultrasound image of the fetus but also to provide a narrative explanation 
of it. These laws turn women’s anatomy into a kind of geographical 
terrain.  
Both types of laws became popular around the same time as the 
uptick in TRAP laws and were likely motivated by many of the same 
factors, such as a desire by abortion opponents to mobilize Casey’s 
doctrinal ambiguities in their favor and to demonstrate that abortion 
opponents were not anti-woman.159 In addition, as further elaborated 
below, such laws exploit the notion of abortion as a medical procedure, 
 
156 Ayelet Schachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
809, 811 (2009); see also id. at 813 (noting a trend of “greater authority for national 
legislatures and regulatory agencies to develop new enforcement policies that 
manipulate the border—bleeding it into the interior or extending it beyond the 
territory’s exteriors—whenever such maneuvers are beneficial to deter access by 
irregular migrants deemed inadmissible or deportable”).  
157 Mathew Coleman, Immigrant Il-Legality: Geopolitical and Legal Borders in the US, 
1882—Present, 17 GEOPOLITICS 402, 403 (2012). 
158 Mae Kuykendall has also recognized both abortion method bans and ultrasound 
mandates as regulations of “places” within a woman’s body. See Kuykendall, supra 
note 13, at 789. 
159 See Ziegler, Liberty, supra note 3, at 457-58; Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty, supra note 
3, at 97-98. Thanks to Mary Ziegler for pointing out this connection. 
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drawing on the objective and respected rhetoric of science while 
mobilizing the potential for scientific uncertainty in support of abortion 
restrictions.160  
A.  Laws Mapping Women’s Bodies 
I have written elsewhere about the way in which the Supreme 
Court’s rhetoric in Gonzales v. Carhart,161 the 2007 “partial-birth” abortion 
case, rhetorically maps the terrain of women’s reproductive anatomy.162 
I will summarize my argument briefly here, and then extend it to 
additional regulatory contexts. The essence of this argument is that 
legislatures have used spatial and geographic techniques to control 
women’s bodies in ways that are similar to their use of spatial regulation 
or manipulation of state and local borders in relation to abortion 
restrictions. 
1. Abortion Method Bans. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, state 
legislatures passed laws banning an abortion method they referred to as 
“partial-birth abortion.”163 This legislation was followed, in 2003, by 
federal legislation aimed at essentially the same procedure.164 Two 
different Supreme Court cases resulted from this legislative activity—
Stenberg v. Carhart, in 2000, which struck down a Nebraska ban, and 
Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007, which upheld the federal ban.165 Thus, after 
Gonzales, both federal law and some state laws mirroring the federal law 
ban this particular procedure.166 
 
160 Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty, supra note 3, at 97.  
161 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
162 B. Jessie Hill, supra note 13. 
163 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 995 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that, 
as of 2000, 28 states had banned the method known as “partial birth abortion”). The 
term “partial-birth abortion” is a political term, not a medically accurate one. It is, 
however, the popular terminology and the language used by the legislation banning 
the abortion method at issue. Hill, supra note 13, at 651 & n.12; see also Siegel, Dignity, 
supra note 9, at 1707. 
164 Partial–Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
165 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922; Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133. 
166 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1202 to 1203; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
750.90h; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:33 to 34; see generally Guttmacher Inst., Bans of 
Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/bans-specific-abortion-methods-
used-after-first-trimester (July 1, 2019). A more recent spate of state laws goes further 
and bans the most common second-trimester abortion procedure, known as “dilation 
and evacuation” or “D&E.”166 Both Stenberg and Gonzales clearly implied that such a 
ban would be unconstitutional—and indeed, the Gonzales Court upheld the ban on 
“partial-birth abortion” partly because of the availability of D&E as an alternative 
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In the course of describing the proscribed “partial-birth” 
abortion procedure, both the legislation and the case law conduct a 
narrative mapping of the female body that demonstrates precisely the 
sort of border manipulation that takes place in more explicitly 
geographical forms of regulation. In particular, the Supreme Court 
engaged, in both cases, in a minute, graphic description of the abortion 
procedure known as intact dilation and evacuation in ways that construct 
the woman’s body as a geographical space that not only permits but 
requires regulation and render the borders of her body profoundly 
manipulable.167  These features of the “partial-birth abortion” cases 
mirror important features of the other spatial-regulation cases. 
One form of border manipulation results from the Court’s 
graphic descriptions of the procedure that takes place inside the woman’s 
body. Here, for example, is one (edited but still lengthy) description of 
the banned abortion procedure by the Gonzales Court: 
In [the banned procedure, also known as intact D 
& E], the doctor extracts the fetus in a way conducive to 
pulling out its entire body, instead of ripping it apart. …  
Rotating the fetus as it is being pulled decreases the 
odds of dismemberment.  A doctor also “may use forceps 
to grasp a fetal part, pull it down, and re-grasp the fetus at 
a higher level—sometimes using both his hand and a 
forceps—to exert traction to retrieve the fetus intact until 
the head is lodged in the [cervix].”  
…. In the usual intact D & E the fetus' head lodges 
in the cervix, and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass. 
…. 
“ ‘At this point, the right-handed surgeon slides the 
fingers of the left [hand] along the back of the fetus and 
“hooks” the shoulders of the fetus with the index and ring 
fingers (palm down). 
“ ‘While maintaining this tension, lifting the cervix 
and applying traction to the shoulders with the fingers of 
the left hand, the surgeon takes a pair of blunt curved 
Metzenbaum scissors in the right hand. He carefully 
advances the tip, curved down, along the spine and under 
 
procedure. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147, 164 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000). No case involving a ban on ordinary D&E abortion has yet 
reached the Supreme Court. 
167 Hill, supra note 13, at 656-69. 
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his middle finger until he feels it contact the base of the 
skull under the tip of his middle finger. 
“ ‘[T]he surgeon then forces the scissors into the 
base of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having 
safely entered the skull, he spreads the scissors to enlarge 
the opening. 
“ ‘The surgeon removes the scissors and 
introduces a suction catheter into this hole and evacuates 
the skull contents. With the catheter still in place, he applies 
traction to the fetus, removing it completely from the 
patient.’ ”168  
This step-by-step detailing of this surgical procedure that occurs 
inside the woman’s body rhetorically erases the borders of her body. The 
woman herself does not appear at all in this description; her body is 
without borders, if it exists at all, as the most intimate parts of her body 
are narratively on display as if they are in public view.169 The procedure 
involves “dilation of the cervix,” just as the fetal head becomes lodged in 
“the cervix.”170 The fetus “passes through” parts of the woman’s anatomy 
and “is removed.”171   It is as though the Court is describing an act of 
violence that a doctor is committing against a fetus on open terrain, 
punctuated by “anatomical landmarks” that invoke the law’s 
application.172 “The female body is,” simply, “a geographic space in 
which the drama plays out between the fetus and the doctor.”173 
But rather than saying that the woman is entirely invisible, it may 
be more accurate to say that she is present only as a victim, entirely 
lacking in agency. In the federal partial-birth abortion ban, as in virtually 
all modern abortion restrictions, the woman is exempted from 
prosecution—as if she has no agency and hence can bear no criminal 
responsibility.174 Indeed, the woman’s primary appearance in Gonzales is 
as an unknowing victim, suffering regret for an act she did not intend to 
commit. As Justice Kennedy opined, “It is self-evident that a mother 
 
168 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 137–38 (citations omitted). 
169 Indeed, the word “woman” appears only five times in the entire majority opinion, 
whereas the words “fetal” and “fetus” occur forty-one times and “doctor” thirty-one 
times. Hill, supra note 162, at 660 (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 134-40). 
170 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 137-39. 
171 Id. at 139-40. 
172 Hill, supra note 13, at 666-67. 
173 Id. at 661. 
174 18 U.S.C. § 1531(e).  
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who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more 
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the 
event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce 
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a 
child assuming the human form.”175 The woman’s verbal absence from 
the scene of the crime, so to speak, represents an absence of agency, 
which nonetheless does not prevent her from regretting what she 
“allowed” to be done to her. Indeed, the possibility of regret, along with 
the purportedly deceptive or coerced nature of the abortion act, ironically 
grounds the restriction on the abortion procedure in the name of 
protecting women’s autonomy.176 
 
But rather than simply disappearing, she is made to disappear 
through the total occupation of her body by a law that manages and 
controls it at an almost microscopic level. One might even think 
metaphorically here of the use of the term “disappear” as a transitive 
verb, as when agents of totalitarian governments seize individual citizens 
and make them disappear from society.177 Both the statutory language of 
the ban and the Court’s opinion in Gonzales re-draw the female anatomy. 
Perhaps most strikingly, both the statute and the majority opinion 
describe the banned procedure as one in which a portion of the fetus is 
“outside the body” of “the mother.”178 Apparently, the reason for this 
turn of phrase is that the prohibited abortion procedure involves passage 
of the fetus beyond the woman’s cervix.179 Yet, the cervix is not, in fact, 
the external border of the woman’s body.180 Nonetheless, the Court and 
 
175 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60. Note that the fetus has a human body, but the 
woman does not.  
176 Professor Jeannie Suk argues that “[t]he harm envisioned in Carhart had the 
structure of trauma: an event whose meaning is not fully realized at the time of its 
occurrence, followed by a period of delay, latency, or ignorance, and then later 
symptoms that trace to the now-realized meaning of the earlier event.” Jeannie Suk, 
The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1236 (2010). She explains that regret becomes trauma as it is “[r]efracted 
through the prism of coercion and non-consent,” thus justifying restrictions on 
women’s autonomy in the name of protecting their autonomy. Id. at 1251. 
177 Thanks to Marc Spindelman for pointing this out. 
178 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160. 
179 Gonzales 550 U.S. at 138 (explaining that, during the banned procedure, “the fetus’ 
head lodges in the cervix, and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass” until the 
physician performs another procedure that ultimately allows intact removal). 
180 “Though the Court seems strangely loath to acknowledge it, there is, technically, 
something between the woman's cervix and the outside world--namely, her vagina. 
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the legislature re-draw these boundaries at will; as in other spatial 
regulation contexts, the placement of borders, as well as their function 
and permeability, matters far less than the ability to manipulate them. 
The “line demarcating activity that can be criminalized from that which 
cannot…[is] not drawn at viability, as it always has been since Roe v. Wade, 
but rather at a place inside the woman's body.”181 It is precisely this ability 
to draw and redraw borders and to infuse them with significance or 
insignificance that is the mark of sovereignty and of social control.  
The insistence that the abortion procedure occurs “outside the 
body” of the woman justifies its regulation. Suggesting that the fetus is 
killed outside the woman’s body makes the procedure more akin to 
infanticide than to abortion. It also justifies the Court’s and the 
legislature’s insistently calling the pregnant woman a “mother”—as if she 
has already given birth.182 This rhetoric rationalizes intrusive regulation 
by turning it into a public, criminal act, rather than a private surgical 
one.183 
2.  Ultrasound Laws. Mandatory ultrasound laws, like abortion 
method bans, have also been popular in state legislatures since the 
1990s.184 Ultrasound is an imaging technique that uses sound waves 
bouncing off of an object (in this case, the fetus) in order to create a 
moving, visual image of the fetus inside the uterus, in real time.185 Like 
 
And indeed, the Court's opinion in Stenberg, like the statute at issue in that case, had 
described the fetus not as being outside the body but rather as being delivered ‘into the 
vagina’ prior to fetal demise.” Hill, supra note 162, at 664–65 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914, 938-40 (2000) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (LexisNexis 
1999)). 
181 Hill, supra note 13, at 667. 
182 Id. at 664. To be fair, the Court refers to the pregnant person as a “mother” in 
other cases as well, including in Roe itself. Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 159-60 
(1973). 
183 As I argue elsewhere:  
The Court's language … renders completely public even those body parts 
one might think of as profoundly private….[T]he law, not the woman 
herself, controls …the divide between what is inside and outside the body, 
between what is private and what is publicly exposed. If the Court 
constructs her vagina as somehow “outside the body,” and if her cervix and 
uterus become, generically, “the cervix” and “the uterus,” then they cannot 
belong to her in the sense that our private bodies belong to us.  
Id. at 668–69 (footnotes omitted). 
184 Guttmacher Inst., Requirements for Ultrasound, https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (July 1, 2019). 
185 F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 182 (25th ed. 2018) (“The 
real-time image on the ultrasound screen is produced by sound waves that are 
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the Supreme Court’s narrative description of the “partial-birth” abortion 
procedure in Gonzales, laws requiring ultrasound imagery of the fetus to 
be displayed prior to an abortion make external and visible that which is 
internal and private, and they similarly turn the woman herself into a 
passive background or geographic space rather than a fully human agent. 
Mandatory ultrasound laws take various, more or less coercive, 
forms. Some states require abortion providers to perform an ultrasound 
before an abortion—which has become a common medical practice in 
any case—and a majority of those states also require the provider to offer 
the woman an opportunity to view the ultrasound image.186 A handful of 
states go further and require that the provider offer a narrative 
description of the visual image, which includes pointing out the fetus’s 
or embryo’s location, making sure the fetal heartbeat is audible, and 
noting the presence of limbs and organs.187 As Carol Sanger has 
observed, such laws not only require women, for no medical reason, to 
view a particular image that they may or may not wish to see, but they 
also require women “to offer up the content of their bodies in the form 
of an image for inspection before the law permits them to end a 
pregnancy.”188 In other words, these laws not only coerce viewing and 
listening to a state-mandated “message,” but they also “coerce[] 
 
reflected back from fluid and tissue interfaces of the fetus, amnionic fluid, and 
placenta.”). 
186 Guttmacher Inst., supra note 184; see also CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: 
TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 120 (2017) (“To 
be sure, many doctors now administer ultrasound routinely before an abortion even 
without legal dictate.”). 
187 For example, Kentucky’s mandatory ultrasound law requires performance of an 
ultrasound before an abortion, as well as “a simultaneous explanation of what the 
ultrasound is depicting, which shall include the presence and location of the unborn 
child within the uterus and the number of unborn children depicted,” display of the 
image so that the woman can see it, and auscultation of “the fetal heartbeat of the 
unborn child so that the pregnant woman may hear the heartbeat if the heartbeat is 
audible.” If she so chooses, the patient may avert her eyes or request that the 
heartbeat volume be turned off. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West); see also, e.g., 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West) (requiring abortion provider 
to perform an ultrasound (“sonogram”) and give, “in a manner understandable to a 
layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram images, including a 
medical description of the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac 
activity, and the presence of external members and internal organs”). 
188 SANGER, supra note 186, at 111. Proponents of such laws argue that there is a 
medical purpose for them, in that they ensure fully informed consent to the abortion 
procedure. Id. at 110. 
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production” of the message itself by the woman.189 And the message that 
is coerced is a sort of “map” of the woman’s uterus, sometimes with key 
landmarks demarcated; the main difference is that the map is one that 
generally magnifies the object it represents, rather than shrinking it to a 
visually useful scale.190 Thus, although justified as measures designed to 
ensure informed consent, in both their compelled-production aspect and 
their detailed narrative and visual mapping of the woman’s own body, 
mandatory ultrasound laws diverge from more straightforward 
informed-consent requirements focusing on the risks and benefits of the 
procedure. 
Like the Supreme Court’s narrative descriptions of the partial-
birth abortion procedure, mandatory ultrasound laws marginalize the 
woman herself. As Rosalind Pollack Petchesky has written, fetal 
imagery—by its nature—“represent[s] the fetus as primary and 
autonomous, the woman as absent or peripheral.”191 The fetus’s body, in 
all its detail, is the focus of mandatory ultrasound laws; the woman 
becomes the mere physical backdrop for the image she is forced to view. 
The woman “now becomes the ‘maternal environment,’ the ‘site’ of the 
fetus, a passive spectator in her own pregnancy.”192 This passivity is 
further enforced by mandatory ultrasound laws which deprive the patient 
of the option to decline the imaging and may even, for all intents and 
purposes, force her to participate in an objectifying ritual—one that turns 
both the fetus and the woman’s anatomy into objects that she must 
visually contemplate as if they are separate from herself.193  
Similarly, the ultrasound requirement involves erasing the 
boundaries of the woman’s body. “Obstetrical technologies of 
visualization…disrupt the very definition, as traditionally understood, of 
 
189 Id. at 111. 
190 E.g., id. at 121-22. 
191 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 268 (1987).  
192 Petchesky, supra note 191, at 277 (quoting Ruth Hubbard, Personal Courage Is Not 
Enough: Some Hazards of Childbearing in the 1980s, in TEST TUBE WOMEN: WHAT 
FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 331, 350 (Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein & Shelli 
Minden, eds., 1984), and BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY: 
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND THE FUTURE OF MOTHERHOOD 113-15 (1986)). 
193 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014) (observing that, in order to 
avoid the display and recitation required by North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound 
law, a woman “must endure the embarrassing spectacle of averting her eyes and 
covering her ears while her physician—a person to whom she should be encouraged 
to listen—recites information to her”). 
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‘inside’ and ‘outside’ a woman’s body, of pregnancy as an ‘interior’ 
experience.”194 The image of the fetus displayed on a screen, outside the 
context of the woman’s body, is meant to suggest it is already a (living, 
separate) baby, much as the language of Gonzales and the Federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act imply that the birth has already occurred and the 
woman is already a mother.195 Moreover, although ultrasound may be 
performed externally (abdominally) or internally (vaginally), some state 
ultrasound mandates essentially compel a vaginal probe—requiring the 
doctor, by law, to breach the borders of the woman’s body.196  
Finally, mandatory ultrasound laws, too, seem to call forth 
further regulation of women’s bodies. Carol Sanger has emphasized that, 
although abortion is legal throughout the U.S., the shaming and physical 
intrusion inherent in the process “underscore[] for women that what they 
are about to do is wrong.”197 In creating a suggestion of fetal personhood, 
like the Court’s language in Gonzales, they imply that what is about to 
occur is not an abortion but a murder.198 Moreover, mandatory 
ultrasound bears a relationship to other forms of excessive, intrusive 
monitoring. Ultrasound creates a “panoptics of the womb”—a space of 
continual monitoring in the name of surveillance and regulation.199 Such 
a space of continual monitoring enables constant regulation without 
active enforcement; it is a metaphor for the mechanism of the modern 
state, in which governmental power, particularly over individuals’ bodies, 
is always felt, even if not itself visibly present.200 
 
194 Petchesky, supra note 191, at 272. 
195 SANGER, supra note 186, at 119; supra text accompanying notes XXX. 
196 SANGER, supra note 186, at 125-26. 
197 SANGER, supra note 186, at 126. Or in Mae Kuykendall’s words, such laws 
“expand the place within the body subject to regulation—sonograms and 
monitoring—and reduce the space available to female embodiment for receipt of 
services.” Kuykendall, supra note 13, at 793. 
198 See, e.g., Jessica Knouse, Mandatory Ultrasounds and the Precession of Simulacra, 54 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 117, 119–20 (2017) (arguing that ultrasound mandates “render 
fetuses ‘children’ and pregnant women their ‘mothers’” and “privilege the imagined 
‘personhood’ of the fetus over the pregnant woman's reality”). 
199 Petchesky, supra note 191, at 277 (emphasis omitted). The term “panoptics” is 
derived from Michel Foucault’s concept of the panopticon, a prison design invented 
by Jeremy Bentham, in which it is possible to observe each prisoner at all times 
without the prisoner knowing whether she is being watched. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200-03 (2d ed. 1995). 
200 Cf. Petchesky, supra note 191, at 269 (“Historically, photographic imagery has 
served …the uses of scientific rationality—as in medical diagnostics and record-
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B.  Implications of Laws Mapping Women’s Bodies 
Though they appear, at first blush, to be quite different from 
TRAP laws and other geographic restrictions, both mandatory 
ultrasound laws and bans on intact D&E function in much the same way 
as those other spatial regulations. They use the manipulation of 
boundaries as a form of control, inscribing or re-inscribing women’s 
inequality while concealing the mechanism by which they do so. They 
rely on the apparent naturalness of particular boundaries—here, bodily 
ones—in order to advance a political agenda while assuming a posture 
of objectivity. And they use physical boundaries to define personhood, 
just as other spatial regulations use geographical boundaries to define and 
delimit citizenship. 
Both kinds of laws rely upon seemingly objective perspectives: 
medical discourse in the case of Gonzales and medical imaging technology 
in the case of the ultrasound.201 Yet this apparent objectivity in each case 
underlies a particular moral or ideological agenda. The clinical 
description of the so-called “partial-birth” procedure constructs the fetal 
demise as occurring partly “outside the body” of the woman—but does 
so only by manipulating the very border of that body and describing the 
female anatomy in a way that is, at the very least, open to question.202 In 
this way, it subtly suggests that the doctor performing the procedure is 
engaged in a criminal act. Similarly, the display and narrative description 
of the fetal anatomy required by some ultrasound laws occurs through 
the use of a technology that makes the fetus appear autonomous and 
separate from the pregnant woman and essentially effaces the borders of 
her own body.203 The artificiality of this impression goes unnoticed, 
however; one court, for example, insisted “[t]hat these medically accurate 
depictions are inherently truthful and non-misleading,” calling them “the 
epitome of truthful, non-misleading information.”204 Women’s internal 
 
keeping—and the tools of bureaucratic rationality—in the political political record 
keeping and police surveillance of the state.”).  
201 Petchesky points to “the visual apparatus’s claim to be ‘an unreasoning machine’ 
that produces ‘an unerring record,’” noting that “the French word for ‘lens’ is 
l’objectif.” Petchesky, supra note 191, at 269. 
202 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 191-196. 
204 Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577-78 
(5th Cir. 2012); see also EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 
429 (6th Cir. 2019) ([N]o one argues that the heartbeat, sonogram, or its description is 
false or misleading. We have previously held that similar information conveys 
objective medical facts”). 
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geography, like the geography of state borders and freestanding abortion 
clinics, is taken for granted, yet always subject to manipulation and 
interpretation.  
Indeed, the hand of the state is present but invisible in the 
drawing of this internal geography. Though driven by legislative 
mandate, the intrusive ultrasound examination may be carried out by any 
medical professional or ultrasound technician.205 It is, in the context of 
mandatory ultrasound laws, “a machinery that assures dissymmetry, 
disequilibrium, difference. Consequently, it does not matter who 
exercises power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the 
machine.”206 It thus may seem as though the woman’s disappearance 
from the scene, or her presentation as being already a mother, results 
purely from the impersonal technology of the ultrasound machine or the 
equally impersonal medical language borrowed by the Court.207 But in 
fact, adoption of those tools and their mobilization in the abortion 
context result from conscious decisions by state actors, not from nature 
or chance. 
Such laws also put into question the relevance of viability as a 
boundary line in constitutional doctrine, perhaps displacing it in favor of 
the cervix as the legally relevant border. This act of border displacement 
is echoed in the anti-abortion literature, which argues that viability—
designated by the Supreme Court as the point before which the state 
cannot impose an undue burden on abortion access—is an arbitrary line 
and should be replaced by another. Indeed, one author, writing in 1984, 
went so far as to erase the woman entirely, stating that “there is no reason 
from the point of view of physiology why fetal humans should be viewed 
as different from born humans,” and that “nothing physiologically 
important happens at the exact instant of birth except that the fetus is 
exposed to the cold air of the world.”208 Note the medically impersonal, 
 
205 SANGER, supra note 186, at 113 (“[A]s the use of ultrasound became more 
commonplace, the methods of obtaining measurements, such as the relation of 
cranium size to age, became standardized. This meant that doctors themselves no 
longer needed to conduct the scans; trained sonographers could do the job.”). 
206 FOUCAULT, supra note 199, at 205 (internal citation omitted). 
207 Dissenting in Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Ginsburg observed that the majority 
effaces women’s agency by assuming that an abortion method ban—rather than a 
robust informed consent requirement—was the only way to protect women from a 
lack of information about the nature of the procedure. Carhart, 505 U.S. at 184 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
208 John M. Goldenring, The Brain-Life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological Definition of 
Humanness, 11 J. MED. ETHICS 198, 199, 201 (1985). Goldenring advocates for brain 
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objective-sounding language: “from the point of view of physiology.” Of 
course, the context demonstrates that the author is referring to fetal 
rather than maternal physiology—but this is precisely the point. The 
woman and her experience of pregnancy and birth are so completely 
absent from the discussion that the apparent irony of these words does 
not even register for their author.  
David Forte has also argued that viability is arbitrary and should 
be replaced with fetal cardiac activity as the point at which “life” 
begins.209 His argument supports the adoption of so-called heartbeat 
bans, which criminalize abortion beginning around six weeks of 
pregnancy, when fetal cardiac activity can first be detected. Others have 
pointed to the supposed ability of the fetus to feel pain at twenty weeks’ 
gestation as support for pre-viability abortion bans.210 The irony is that 
this incessant search for a new and more definitive border or marker, 
with its constant appeals to purported objective medical facts, results 
only in a proliferation of potential borders, highlighting their 
arbitrariness. Of course, it is not the existence of the borders themselves 
that is problematic. The law largely functions through the drawing of 
lines and designating points at which conduct crosses over from legal to 
illegal, all of which could be considered arbitrary “borders.” The problem 
with such borders in abortion discourse is the failure to recognize that 
they represent a moral and political, rather than an objective medical or 
technical judgment.211 
V. Reconsidering the Constitutional Landscape 
Several common themes emerge from examining the various 
forms of spatial regulation of abortion. As discussed below, these shared 
features of spatial regulations help to explain the particular attractiveness 
of this mode of legislation, perhaps particularly for lawmakers who seek 
 
life, which, he asserts, begins at approximately eight weeks in utero, as the point at 
which an embryo becomes a human being. 
209 David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 121, 140 (2013) (“There is a better marker…. That marker is the point at which 
the onset of cardiac activity in the fetus occurs. We are speaking of heartbeat.”). 
210 John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 365 (2011). 
211 Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 275 (1992) (explaining, in the 
abortion context, how “medical analysis displaces social analysis of the exercise of 
state power entailed in restricting women's access to abortion”). 
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to restrict access without making this purpose apparent. This Part 
summarizes those features, drawing connections among the three types 
of spatial restrictions analyzed in this Article, and then considers the 
constitutional implications of understanding many of the existing 
abortion restrictions in this way. 
A. Why spatial regulation? 
It is now possible to sketch an answer to this question. Because 
of certain features inherent in this type of law, spatial regulation of 
abortion is particularly appealing when the goal is to restrict abortion 
access. The effects of spatial regulation often arise from existing social 
and economic arrangements, such that the role of the state in bringing 
about those effects appears to be attenuated, if present at all. At the same 
time, the manipulation of borders and boundaries is submerged under an 
appearance of inevitability. Spatial regulation, which relies upon and 
invokes the state’s police power to protect the health and safety of 
citizens, often appears uncontroversial and apolitical. For example, 
spatial regulations may simply designate certain places as types of places, 
in which certain activity is or is not permitted to occur, with legal 
consequences that flow from those designations. The drawing of lines 
and labeling of places appears to be a technical or administrative one, but 
significant political consequences flow from it—including, often, the 
exacerbation of preexisting inequalities. Although this exacerbation may 
not always be an explicit goal of spatial regulation, it is at a minimum a 
known and expected outcome of it, albeit one that by and large escapes 
constitutional scrutiny. 
When a state passes legislation that has the effect of making it 
nearly an “abortion-free zone”; when it limits access to abortion even 
out-of-state; or when the U.S. Government attempts to put young 
asylum-seekers to the choice of either remaining in the U.S. and forgoing 
an abortion or leaving the country, it may appear to be exercising exactly 
the kind of “border control” that sovereigns are expected and entitled to 
exercise. Yet it is acting not only upon the borders themselves but also 
upon individuals; it is designating those individuals as either fully entitled 
to the benefits and protections of the Constitution, or something less. 212 
 
212 Cf. NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 54 
(1994) (“Legal categories are used to construct and differentiate material spaces 
which, in turn, acquire a legal potency that has direct bearing on those using and 
traversing such spaces.”). 
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It is also stigmatizing both abortion and the people who seek it by 
designating them as outsiders with respect to the political community.213 
This sort of sovereign line-drawing also occurs with respect to 
the physical places where abortions take place. If any place where 
abortions are regularly performed is designated an “ambulatory surgical 
facility,” it is required to conform to licensing and other requirements, 
which often depend on a relationship with a local hospital.214 As 
explained above, differential spatial regulation of abortion clinics has 
arguably led to the increased isolation of abortion from health care more 
generally and of abortion providers from “mainstream” health care 
providers.215 It then further disempowers abortion providers and patients 
in making the availability of abortion services dependent on private 
actors, such as hospitals, that operate outside the field of abortion 
provision and may themselves be influenced by the abortion stigma that 
this form of spatial regulation creates. 
Finally, the state both draws and manipulates boundaries within 
pregnant bodies by means of mandatory ultrasound laws and “partial-
birth” abortion laws. Particular legal consequences flow from the 
location of the fetus during an abortion procedure and from the features 
of the visual and auditory map of the fetus during an ultrasound.216 Moral 
consequences also flow from the state’s mapping and line-drawing, as 
the woman symbolically appears to be separate from her fetus; she 
narratively becomes a mother rather than a pregnant woman, and her 
abortion is analogized to murder. 
In each case, spatial regulation exploits and yet conceals two key 
features of its operation. First, spatial regulation both relies upon and 
 
213 Cf. Zick, supra note 20, at 537 (“[R]esort to spatiality or territory often produces 
more than mere regulation of populations and behaviors. Displacement sometimes 
has a communicative function; it may brand those who are displaced.”)  
214 See supra Part I.A; see, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.30(A)(1)(a); Founder's Women's 
Health Ctr. v. Ohio State Dep't of Health, No. 01AP-872, 2002 WL 1933886, at *14 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2002) (holding that abortion clinics are “ambulatory surgical 
facilities” under state law and therefore subject to particular licensing requirements). 
215 See supra Part II.B. 
216 Specifically, if the fetal heartbeat is detectable during the ultrasound, the abortion 
may be prohibited under so-called “heartbeat” abortion bans (all of which have 
nonetheless been held unenforceable as of this writing). Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 
No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2019 WL 2869640, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 2019); MKB Mgmt. 
Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772–73 (8th Cir. 2015) (North Dakota), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 981 (2016); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs, 951 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 
2020); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE83074, 
2019 WL 312072 (Iowa Dist. Jan. 22, 2019). 
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conceals the reality that borders are profoundly manipulable. Legal 
categories—such as “ambulatory surgical center”—may appear neutral 
and technical, but they are politically determined and often have 
significant consequences that are far from unavoidable. As Richard Ford 
has argued, the very “practice of organizing activities as first and 
foremost occurring in a place defined by its borders is a habit, not a 
necessity.”217 Likewise, the geography of a given state may seem natural 
and inevitable; but laws such as admitting-privileges requirements that 
encourage the concentration of abortion availability in large cities also 
have predictable and usually intended consequences for abortion access, 
particularly for poor and rural women.218 Nonetheless, courts often treat 
such realities as—in the words of one court—“not a factor of state 
law.”219 It is precisely the ability to impose and enforce legal categories 
while minimizing the appearance of state action that makes spatial 
regulation so attractive for lawmakers wishing to avoid constitutional 
challenge. “[C]reating a border is not an act of recognizing a difference 
but once of making a distinction”; yet, at the same time, “[b]orders do 
their work by making the distinctions seem natural and inevitable.”220 
Second, spatial regulation reinscribes underlying inequalities, 
while appearing to act neutrally and without reference to categories of 
race, sex, or poverty.221 Indeed, nearly all abortion restrictions 
disproportionately impact poor women and women of color, who are 
more likely to seek abortions in the first place.222 Restrictions that require 
greater travel, including travel to other states, predictably hinder those 
same groups of women.223 Although this might not be the explicit 
 
217 Richard Thompson Ford, Law and Borders, 64 ALA. L. REV. 123, 128 (2012). Ford 
has produced an extensive literature on the relationship between law and geography, 
with a particular emphasis on the ways in which law’s mobilization of boundaries and 
space creates and aggravates racial inequalities. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, supra 
note 25. 
218 See supra Part II.B. 
219 Utah Women’s Clinic, 844 F. Supp. at 1491 n.11. 
220 Ford, supra note 217, at 139. 
221 Cf. BLOMLEY, supra note 212, at 190-91 (“The construction of racism through the 
division and encoding of urban space…can easily be obscured: spatial boundaries and 
differences can easily appear as natural or simply accidental.”). 
222 Sabrina Tavernise, Why Women Getting Abortions Now Are More Likely to Be Poor, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019) (stating that “[h]alf of all women who got an abortion in 
2014 lived in poverty, double the share from 1994”). 
223 Supra Part II.B.; see generally Linda Greenhouse, Chasing Abortion Rights Across the 
State Line, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016).  
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intention of lawmakers, it is a known consequence.224 In many cases, 
reducing abortion access by imposing on already vulnerable individuals 
may simply be the simplest tool at hand.225 And because the law’s unequal 
effects are not its explicit purpose, it evades constitutional scrutiny which 
might otherwise arise under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment226 or the “purpose” prong of the undue burden 
analysis (under which an abortion restriction is unconstitutional if it is 
adopted with the purpose of creating a substantial obstacle to abortion 
access).227 
B. Constitutional Contexts 
Do the insights presented in this Article about the nature and 
functioning of spatial abortion regulation lead to any new constitutional 
implications? Some possibilities present themselves. First, some scholars 
have already considered the constitutional right to travel in relation to 
territorial restrictions. Below, I summarize and expand that line of 
argument. Second, a careful analysis of spatial regulation has yielded the 
insight that state action is pervasively present yet often invisible. 
Recognizing this fact might lead to a broader understanding of state 
action than the case law has adopted to date. In particular, this broader 
understanding of state action could affect the treatment of non-
delegation claims in the abortion context. Third, a close examination of 
spatial discourse in mandatory ultrasound and procedure-ban cases 
 
224 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 295, 315-
18 (1991) (analyzing the impact of spatial regulation on homeless individuals, 
distinguishing between harm that is intended by lawmakers and harm for which 
lawmakers should be blamed). 
225 During the 1977 congressional debate over the Hyde Amendment, Representative 
Henry Hyde stated, “I certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody 
having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman. 
Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the ... Medicaid bill.” See, e.g.,Magda 
Schaler-Haynes, Arina Chesnokova, Cynthia Cox, Marla Feinstein, Amanda & Sussex, 
Julia Harris, Abortion Coverage and Health Reform: Restrictions and Options for Exchange-
Based Insurance Markets, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 323, 387 (2012). 
226 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that a law does not violate 
the Equal Protection solely due to a disparate racial impact; the law must also have a 
discriminatory purpose). 
227 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). (“A 
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation 
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”); see generally Note, After Ayotte: The Need to 
Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed "Purpose," 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2565 (2006) 
(arguing for renewed focus on the purpose prong of Casey’s undue-burden test). 
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produces the insight that it is moral and political judgments, rather than 
scientific ones, that lead to the construction of particular ideas about 
abortion and motherhood. As discussed below, this insight should lead 
courts to reject the notion that scientific advances have changed our 
understanding of abortion in ways that are legally relevant. 
The discussion that follows here is not intended to present an 
exhaustive analysis of each of these potential constitutional claims. In 
fact, each potential claim could likely generate a complete scholarly article 
of its own. Rather, Part is intended primarily to serve as an overview of 
how a proper understanding of spatial regulation might affect 
constitutional, as a potential research agenda on spatial regulation in the 
abortion context, and as a series of suggestions for new arguments that 
could be mobilized in both the courts and the political arena to challenge 
abortion restrictions in the future, including in a possible future in which 
Roe v. Wade has been overturned or radically limited.  
1. The Right (Not) to Travel and States’ Duties to Afford Access. As an 
increasing number of states are left with only one abortion clinic, and 
others continue to adopt increasingly onerous abortion restrictions, the 
underlying principles of Missouri ex rel. Gaines become more pertinent. 
Gaines, which dealt with racial segregation, stands for the propositions 
that federalism does not necessarily entail a patchwork in which 
individual access to basic constitutional rights differs widely depending 
on one’s state of residence, and that states may not delegate their 
responsibility for protecting citizens’ freedom to other sovereign states. 
The understanding of federalism derived from Gaines and its application 
in the abortion context intersects, moreover, with case law and 
scholarship pertaining to the constitutional right to travel under Article 
IV, section 2 of the Constitution and under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution. 
The possibility of a future in which Roe v. Wade has been 
overruled has already generated scholarly literature considering the 
possibility that some states may choose not only to ban abortion within 
the state, but also to prohibit their residents from traveling to other states 
where abortion is legal in order to access abortion.228 Seth Kreimer has 
argued that such an extraterritorial abortion ban would violate several 
constitutional provisions, including the right to travel protected by 
 
228 See sources cited supra note 13. 
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Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution.229 Kreimer opines that this right, 
which includes the right to enter and leave any state of the union and to 
be treated on equal terms with each state’s citizens while there, would be 
inhibited by a law that attaches criminal penalties to doing precisely 
that.230 Other commentators have been more skeptical, noting that 
courts, including the Supreme Court, have upheld laws restricting travel 
by a state’s adult citizens with the purpose of evading state law.231 
Ultimately, it seems that this relatively open constitutional question 
would turn on how courts might resolve what Richard Fallon has called 
“the competing claims of state and national citizenship,” in that courts 
in a post-Roe world would be forced to decide whether a state’s interest 
in protecting fetuses outweighs the woman’s physical liberty, including 
the right to travel among the states and to enjoy the privileges and 
immunities of those states.232 On one hand, this balancing test may weigh 
in favor of the woman who seeks to travel, given the significant degree 
of moral disagreement about this issue; the possibility of travel to another 
state could be seen as a kind of accommodation to women who disagree 
with an anti-abortion state’s moral judgment.233 Yet, one might ask, if a 
state has a constitutionally sufficient interest in enforcing its laws on its 
own citizens, within its own borders, why should it not have an interest 
in enforcing its laws when its citizens go to other states?234 
 
229 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2 (“The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several states.”). 
230 Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 13, at 511; see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 
(1999) (explaining that the right to travel under Article IV protects “the right to be 
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present 
in” another state). It is possible that criminalizing such travel would also violate the 
component of the right to travel that includes “the right of a citizen of one State to 
enter and to leave another State,” id., which is not specifically identified in the 
Constitution but has been considered either simply a fundamental component of U.S. 
federalism, id. at 501, or an aspect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-29 (1981). 
231 Fallon, supra note 13, at 638-39; Appleton, supra note 13, at 675-76. 
232 Fallon, supra note 13, at 639-40. 
233 See G. Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 
337, 340 (2002); Cohen, supra note 13, at 1370-71. 
234 Glenn Cohen makes this argument in the context of international travel, where its 
logic is perhaps even more compellingly supportive of extraterritorial application. 
Cohen, supra note 13, at 1370-71. Moreover, he notes that such accommodation 
would benefit only individuals with the means to travel and that “it keys enforcement 
to where the harm is done,” which is by and large irrelevant to the moral rightness or 
wrongness of abortion. Id. at 1371.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702574
56 GEOGRAPHY OF ABORTION RIGHTS  
Ultimately, the answer to this question may depend in part on 
whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2 is 
best understood as a grant of individual rights to U.S. citizens or as a 
federalism constraint on states, meant to protect goodwill and unity 
among them by prohibiting legislation that advances economic 
protectionism or otherwise discriminates against out-of-staters. If it is 
only the latter, then perhaps Article IV only protects against actions by 
destination states that prevent citizens of other states from availing 
themselves of the benefits of the destination state.235 If it is the former—
if it is, as Part I argues, a protection of the liberty itself in its most 
fundamental form—then it would appear to limit the extraterritorial 
reach of abortion prohibitions, because individual citizens of a restrictive 
state would nonetheless possess an entitlement by virtue of Article IV to 
travel to other states to enjoy the benefits of the laws of those states, an 
entitlement which could not be infringed by their home states.236  
This right-to-travel framework may provide a powerful doctrinal 
and political argument in a possible future world without Roe. It appears 
to have limited applicability in the current context, however. To be sure, 
Article IV may prohibit states with highly restrictive abortion laws from 
requiring their citizens to avail themselves of those laws rather than travel 
outside the state. But other than in the case of minors, states have not 
generally attempted to apply their restrictions extraterritorially and, in 
fact, have instead seemingly encouraged women to travel out of state to 
access abortion.237  
On the other hand, one possibility for combatting abortion 
restrictions that result in a lack of access, or severely reduced access, to 
abortion in a particular state might derive from a right not to travel.238 
This right not to travel is the flip side of the right to travel—just as the 
First Amendment right to speak includes a right not to speak.239 A right 
not to travel would mean that women have a right to access 
constitutionally protected health care services within their own states and 
 
235 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). 
236 Of course, an additional constraint on the right-to-travel argument is that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only citizens of the U.S. Thus, non-citizens, 
already uniquely burdened by abortion restrictions in some parts of the country, could 
not avail themselves of the arguments described here.  
237 See supra text accompanying note 145. 
238 A theoretical right not to travel (albeit not in the U.S. constitutional context) has 
been suggested by Nicholas Blomley. See BLOMLEY, supra note 212, at 210. 
239 U.S. CONST. AMDT. I (“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of 
speech….”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
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cannot be required to become “reproductive refugees” in order to retain 
control over their reproductive decisionmaking.  
Such a principle may be identified in those cases in which courts 
have struck down laws that would close the last abortion clinic in a given 
state, relying on Gaines. In JWHO, for example, the court held that the 
availability of abortion services in neighboring states did not absolve 
Mississippi of its responsibility to avoid imposing an undue burden on 
abortion access within the state.240 As the Seventh Circuit similarly 
explained in a similar case: 
 
[The idea that] the harm to a constitutional right [can be] 
measured by the extent to which it can be exercised in 
another jurisdiction ... [is] a profoundly mistaken 
assumption. In the First Amendment context, the Supreme 
Court long ago made it clear that one is not to have the 
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places 
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other 
place.…  It's hard to imagine anyone suggesting that 
Chicago may prohibit the exercise of a free-speech or 
religious-liberty right within its borders on the ground that 
those rights may be freely enjoyed in the suburbs.241 
 
In that case, the Seventh Circuit relied in part on its prior decision in 
Ezell v. City of Chicago, in which it struck down a Chicago law that 
effectively banned handguns within city limits by requiring handgun 
owners to have at least one hour of training at a firing range, and then 
prohibiting firing ranges within the city limits.242 In that case, the court 
rejected the idea that the plaintiffs did not suffer any harm because they 
could travel outside the jurisdiction in order to exercise their Second 
Amendment rights.243 It also noted the irony that “the City considers live 
firing-range training so critical to responsible firearm ownership that it 
mandates this training as a condition of lawful firearm possession,” while 
 
240 Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
241 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 918–19 (7th Cir. 
2015 (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir.2011) (quotation 
marks and internal citations omitted)). 
242 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 691. 
243 Id. at 697. 
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at the same time prohibiting such ranges.244 Similarly, in the abortion 
context, states consider written transfer agreements and admitting 
privileges vital to safe abortion practice, while at the same time creating 
various obstacles to obtaining them, such as forbidding public hospitals 
from participating.245 
Abortion restrictions that effectively “forc[e] [women] to leave 
the state to exercise their constitutional right”—whether because they 
close all abortion clinics in the state or, for example, make the procedure 
unavailable after a particular stage of pregnancy—could be considered 
unconstitutional under this logic.246 The rationales of Gaines and Ezell 
thus provide a tool for challenging laws that hollow out any the right to 
access abortion, such that a state is left without a single abortion 
provider. Citizens have a right not to be forced to travel to another state 
to exercise their federally guaranteed constitutional rights; Gaines thus 
presents a sort of mirror image of the right to travel—a right not to be 
forced to travel in order to access basic rights. Indeed, as Jeremy Waldron 
has explained in the context of considering states’ obligations to refrain 
from legislation that limits homeless persons’ access to public spaces, 
“Everything that is done has to be done somewhere. No one is free to 
perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it.”247 
Making and enforcing rules that result in the unavailability of places 
where an action may legally be performed restricts that activity just as 
surely as a direct ban might do.248 
One might argue that Gaines should have limited relevance in the 
abortion context, however, because the state’s duty to provide equal 
protection of the laws—that is, to provide a benefit such as public 
education on equal terms to all citizens, if it provides that benefit at all—
 
244 Id. at 704-05. 
245 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 3727.60(B)(1) (forbidding public hospitals to enter 
into written transfer agreements with abortion clinics). 
246 JWHO, 760 F.3d at 456 (citing Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 
1996), which struck down a law significantly restricting abortions after twenty weeks 
gestation). The current wave of laws banning abortions by the common method 
known as “D&E” similarly threaten to make abortion unavailable after about fourteen 
to seventeen weeks of pregnancy. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 
1069 (E.D. Ark. 2017), amended, No. 4:17-CV-00404-KGB, 2017 WL 6946638 (E.D. 
Ark. Aug. 2, 2017) (noting that women “would immediately lose the right to obtain a 
pre-viability abortion anywhere in the State of Arkansas after 14.0 weeks LMP if the 
D & E Mandate were allowed to take effect.”). 
247 Waldron, supra note 224, at 296. 
248 Id. at 304-06. 
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is conceptually quite different from the state’s responsibility under the 
Due Process Clause not to interfere with abortion access, which is 
provided by private entities. Indeed, this was the counter-argument 
raised by the dissent in JWHO, which declined even to find state action 
behind the refusal of hospitals to grant legally required admitting 
privileges to abortion clinics in the state.249 The dissenting judge in that 
case noted that in the Gaines context, unlike the abortion context, the 
state was providing a service, and that unlike the Equal Protection 
Clause, the substantive due process guarantee “does not require a state 
to take any action but rather to refrain from taking unconstitutional 
actions.”250 The dissent thus seems to suggest that applying Gaines in the 
substantive due process context wrongly imposes a positive obligation 
on states to provide a service, rather than a negative obligation to avoid 
interfering with women’s access to abortion.251 
Yet, the above discussion of spatial regulation demonstrates that 
what appears to be a neutral restriction on abortion access often has 
differential effects on poor women, rural women, and women of color. 
Moreover, courts and scholars—including, most prominently, the 
plurality opinion in Casey—have also come to recognize that the abortion 
right is a form of equality right, being necessary to women’s economic 
and social equality.252 Though abortion restrictions are not generally 
found to be in direct conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, this 
insight demonstrates the fundamental connection between equality 
concerns and substantive due process principles. In addition, some right 
of access is already implied by existing abortion jurisprudence; Whole 
Woman’s Health, after all, held that a law was unconstitutional because it 
 
249 JWHO, 760 F.3d at 461 (Garza, J., dissenting) (“Regardless of the propriety or 
legality of the hospitals’ actions, what matters for this substantive due process analysis 
is that JWHO has not shown that the Clinic’s closure would result directly from [the 
statute], as opposed to the independent decisions of local hospitals—non-state 
actors.”). 
250 Id. at 463. 
251 For a discussion of the distinction between positive and negative rights, and the 
fact that the U.S. Constitution is often (if somewhat incorrectly) understood to confer 
only the former, see, e.g., Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of 
Our Rights: The Right to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1003-
12 (2010). 
252 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992); see also Appleton, supra 
note 13, at 660-62. 
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would shut down too many abortion clinics, creating a substantial 
obstacle to abortion access in the state.253  
Still, there must be meaningful limits to this principle. Otherwise, 
it suggests that states must always provide whatever individuals need in 
order to exercise their rights. If there is no clinic or gun manufacturer in 
a given state for reasons that have nothing to do with the laws of the 
state, is the state required to build one? Does the right not to travel in 
order to access abortion services imply that each state must adopt the 
regulations of the most liberal state in the union? Obviously, further 
specification of this claim would be necessary. It seems, however, that 
the notion of a right not to travel, combined with the equality-inspired 
doctrinal tradition of Gaines, might provide a basis for arguing that states 
have an obligation to ensure at least a minimum level of abortion 
availability and access as an incident of citizenship. 
2. Private Non-delegation claims. In the abortion context, plaintiffs 
have sometimes raised a species of “private non-delegation” claim to 
challenge spatial regulations. Such claims have a long pedigree, but the 
doctrinal line has recently begun to falter. For over a century, courts have 
accepted the notion that the government cannot, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause, grant standardless discretion to private entities to enforce 
certain kinds of legal rules in ways that infringe others’ constitutional 
rights. However, this rule has largely remained under-developed, and in 
the abortion regulation context, it seems to be losing force. As the above 
discussion indicates, however, this doctrine captures an important but 
often unrecognized problem with many spatial abortion regulations: in 
relying on neutral-seeming rules that delegate authority to private parties, 
they conceal the role of the state in exploiting pre-existing hostility to 
abortion and other features of the geographical context to intentionally 
reduce abortion access. 
In the 1912 case Eubank v. City of Richmond,254 the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional a city ordinance that allowed two-thirds of 
property owners on a street to dictate a demand a particular setback for 
future building.255 This decision directly affected the plaintiff, who had 
purchased land and begun planning a home that would not conform to 
the setback.256 Although the lower courts had upheld the law, the 
 
253 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, ---U.S.----, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299 (2016), as 
revised (June 27, 2016). 
254 226 U.S. 137 (1912). 
255 Id. at 141, 144. 
256 Id. at 142. 
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Supreme Court found it to be an unconstitutional use of the state’s police 
power, emphasizing that the law allowed “[o]ne set of owners [to] 
determine[] not only the extent of use, but the kind of use which another 
set of owners may make of their property.”257 In particular, the Court 
was concerned that the law imposed no standard on those private parties’ 
use of their power, allowing them to act capriciously, out of self-interest, 
or simply out their own arbitrary sense of taste.258 Indeed, the Court 
noted, if an individual owned enough property, that single person could 
dictate the rights of a number of property owners.259 
The Supreme Court subsequently relied upon Eubank in another 
case from the same era—State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. 
Roberge.260 There, the Court found a similar law—allowing certain kinds 
of buildings to be constructed only with the consent of nearby property 
owners—to be unconstitutional.261 Noting that the neighbors’ authority 
was “uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative 
action,” with no possibility of review, the Court again expressed concern 
that the private property owners were “free to withhold consent for 
selfish reasons or arbitrarily.”262 Thus, the Court held, the law violated 
Fourteenth Amendment by attempting an “unconstitutional delegation 
of power.”263 
Both cases arose during an era in which courts engaged in close 
scrutiny of states’ use of their police power, freely striking down laws 
that did not advance health, safety, or morals. Moreover, they preceded 
the modern era of equal protection and substantive due process 
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, they embody principles that retain vitality 
today. As noted below, courts continued to recognize, well into the 
twentieth century, that any delegation of governmental authority to 
private parties must be exercised pursuant to governmentally prescribed 
standards; otherwise, it is arbitrary and unconstitutional, just as any other 
arbitrary use of governmental power would be.264  
 
257 Id. at 143. 
258 Id. at 143-44. 
259 Id. 
260 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
261 Id. at 122-23. 
262 Id.  
263 Id.  
264 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 584 n.15 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), and Illinois Elections Board v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)). 
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This principle has sometimes been used to strike down abortion 
regulations that require clinics to seek the permission of a private third 
party in order to operate, such as by requiring admitting privileges or 
hospital transfer agreements. In a case decided shortly after Roe v. Wade, 
for example, a district court held that a law requiring abortion clinics to 
have either a transfer agreement or hospital admitting privileges for its 
physicians violated due process.265 Noting that the law imposed no 
standards for the grant or denial of agreements or privileges by hospitals 
and no opportunity for judicial or administrative review, the court 
analogized to cases in the First Amendment context striking down 
licensing schemes that grant standardless discretion to state officials.266 
“The state cannot grant hospitals the arbitrary power to veto the 
performance of abortions for any reason or no reason at all, it explained; 
“The state cannot grant hospitals power it does not have itself.”267  
But more recent case law is mixed. Some courts have struck 
down spatial abortion restrictions on this basis. In Planned Parenthood of 
Wisconsin v. Van Hollen, for example, the district court struck down 
Wisconsin’s admitting privileges law on precisely this basis.268 The Eighth 
Circuit rejected a similar challenge to an admitting privileges 
requirement—but one that was imposed directly on physicians who 
perform abortions rather than on clinics—by asserting that the law 
“involve[d] state regulation of the qualifications of persons who perform 
abortions rather than standards for licensure of abortion clinics.”269 More 
commonly, though, both courts and parties have shown discomfort with 
such claims, either cursorily rejecting them or simply avoiding them. For 
example, the Seventh Circuit simply glossed over the nondelegation 
 
265 Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153, 
1158 (E.D.N.C. 1974). 
266 Id. at 1158. 
267 Id. at 1158-59; see also Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 508 F. Supp. 1366, 
1374 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (striking down a written-transfer agreement requirement as 
“violat[ing] due process concepts because they delegate a licensing function to private 
entities without standards to guide their discretion”). 
268 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 997 
(W.D. Wis.), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 
F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015). 
269 Women's Health Ctr. of W. Cty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1382 (8th Cir. 
1989); see also Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
748 F.3d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a nondelegation claim on the same 
grounds as Webster); Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health & 
Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a nondelegation 
challenge because the likelihood of hospitals exercising an arbitrary veto was remote). 
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argument in affirming the Van Hollen decision on other grounds.270 In 
other recent cases, courts have simply declined to reach such claims,271 
or plaintiffs have declined to press them.272 
Private nondelegation doctrine is particularly well suited to 
application in the context of spatial regulations for several reasons. First, 
private nondelegation doctrine has primarily been applied in the zoning 
and licensing contexts—contexts which are subject to spatial 
regulation—since they implicate property rights of which individuals 
cannot be denied without due process of law.273 (Indeed, as such, they do 
not even depend on the constitutionally protected status of the abortion 
right and could be used post-Roe to challenge spatial restrictions in states 
where abortion is legal but heavily restricted.)  More importantly, when 
they operate to shut down abortion clinics, delegations to private actors 
rely on several factors unique to spatial regulation in the abortion 
context. For example, admitting privileges and written transfer 
agreement laws may specify a particular maximum distance that the 
hospital can sit from the clinic. Inevitably, such distance specifications 
limit the universe of institutions from which clinics may seek assistance 
to stay in business, thus increasing their vulnerability to closure at the 
whim of powerful actors within those institutions. More fundamentally, 
such spatial requirements also rely upon the geographical isolation of 
clinics, including the fact that abortions are largely performed outside the 
hospital setting—a fact largely attributable to the precise hostility to 
 
270 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015). 
271 See, e.g., EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Glisson, No. 3:17-CV-00189-GNS, 
2018 WL 6444391, at *28 n.29 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2018) (declining to reach 
nondelegation claim).  
272 Jackson Womens' Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D. Miss. 
2013), order clarified sub nom. Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Mary Currier, MD., 
M.P.H., No. 3:12CV436-DPJ-FKB, 2013 WL 12122002 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 13, 2013), 
and aff'd as modified sub nom. Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 
448 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hile [the clinic] may have a valid due-process claim, it 
expressly reserved the claim in its Reply, which may indicate that it is somehow 
infirm. The Court will stop here, but to avoid piece-meal adjudication, the Court 
advises Plaintiffs to assert their arguments if they deem them worthy.”). 
273 See, e.g., Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[D]ue process protects an interest in the continued operation of an existing 
business.”); Spinelli v. New York, No. 07-CV-1237, 2009 WL 2413929, at *6 (2d Cir. 
Aug. 7, 2009). 
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abortion on the part of hospitals and hospital-based physicians that make 
it so hard for clinics to meet these requirements.274 
The private nondelegation doctrine, properly understood, 
represents a potentially powerful tool for challenging spatial abortion 
regulations. The idea that the government may not act arbitrarily, either 
on its own or by delegating arbitrary and standardless authority to private 
parties, has survived the vicissitudes of constitutional doctrine over more 
than a century. It can be identified in cases such as Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 
in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute allowing churches to 
veto the issuance of liquor licenses to nearby businesses,275 and Palmore v. 
Sidoti, in which the Court held that presumed private racial biases could 
not be allowed to dictate official decisionmaking with respect to child 
custody.276 Although Larkin and Palmore were not decided on due process 
grounds, they demonstrate that the principle forbidding delegation of an 
arbitrary veto over a third party’s liberty has been incorporated into 
numerous doctrinal spaces.  
Moreover, the case law demonstrates the relationship between 
the due process concern at the heart of the private nondelegation 
doctrine and equality concerns. Both the early cases, such as Roberge, and 
more modern cases, such as Hallmark Clinic, cite to Yick Wo v. Hopkins as 
authority for the notion that the right to do business cannot be delegated 
to private or public individuals’ arbitrary whim.277 Yick Wo, of course, was 
a case involving an ordinance forbidding laundries to operate in wood-
frame buildings, unless the board of supervisors consented to it.278 The 
petitioner alleged that the prohibition was enforced only against 
 
274 See GINSBURG, supra note 87 & n.21 (explaining that hospitals’ refusal to perform 
abortions after Roe was largely attributable to “the convictions of individual medical 
personnel or … the fears of hospital officials and governing bodies that too high an 
abortion rate would give their institution the reputation of being an ‘abortion mill’”); 
Ziegler, Liberty, supra note 3, at 442 (noting that the anti-abortion strategy behind 
TRAP laws relied on the fact that “the burden created by a law resulted not from the 
statute itself but rather from economic and political circumstances over which the 
government had no control”); 
275 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (striking the law on 
Establishment Clause grounds and finding that it “substitute[d] the unilateral and 
absolute power of a church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative 
body acting on evidence and guided by standards”). 
276 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
277 Hallmark Clinic, 380 F. Supp. at 1158 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
370 (1886)); Roberge, 278 U.S. at 122 (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366). 
278 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356. 
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businesspeople of Chinese descent.279 Though the Supreme Court did 
not focus on the racial discrimination committed by city officials, it did 
find that the ordinance conferred “a naked and arbitrary power to give 
or withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to persons,” and 
therefore violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.280 In 
fact, while citing both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, it 
made explicit the connection between standardless discretion and 
discrimination, noting that the ability to make arbitrary decisions allowed 
officials to discriminate against Chinese business owners, treating 
otherwise similarly situated businesses differently.281 This connection 
between arbitrariness and discrimination is evident in Palmore as well.282 
To be sure, this principle may also raise some new concerns, such 
as whether it has coherent limits that can be consistently applied by 
courts. To some extent, the case law itself identifies such limits. 
Generally, courts have found that a nondelegation challenge will fail if 
the private delegation is subject to judicial or administrative review (in 
which codified standards may be applied),283 or if there is reason to 
believe that the authority will not be exercised arbitrarily.284 
Comprehensive development of the private nondelegation doctrine and 
its application to spatial regulations must therefore await another article; 
the goal of this Part has been to show that it may provide a basis for 
challenge to some regulations that otherwise appear likely to survive 
under current doctrine.285 
3. Scientific boundaries. A final insight regarding spatial abortion 
regulation that might yield some constitutional payoff is the recognition 
that boundaries—whether geographical or anatomical—are products of 
legal and moral decisionmaking, not irrefutable facts that must be taken 
for granted. Borders “are made, not found.”286 This insight might give 
 
279 Id. at 356. 
280 Id. at 366. 
281 Id. at 373-74. 
282 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a 
racially restrictive covenant would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
283 See, e.g., Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 610 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the state’s ability to grant a waiver from the written transfer agreement 
requirement saved it from invalidation as an impermissible delegation); Hallmark 
Clinic, 380 F. Supp. at 1158 n.8. 
284 See, e.g., Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555-56 (9th Cir. 2004). 
285 Supra Part XX. 
286 Ford, supra note 100, at 127. 
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some cause for skepticism about attempts to draw a different line than 
viability for when abortion is permissible under the Constitution and 
about a recent spate of claims that scientific advances have shown 
definitive support for a different such borderline.  
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court recognized the 
inevitable criticism of the viability line as being a moving target, while 
strongly reaffirming that the core of the privacy right was the woman’s 
ability to choose abortion before viability.287 When faced with argument 
urging it to overturn the viability framework, the Court held that there 
was no line that better balanced the interests of the woman and the state, 
and no advances in medicine had changed that fact, regardless of when, 
exactly, viability occurred.288 
Yet, advocates for restricting abortion rights have argued that the 
viability line is arbitrary, promoting a different line between legality and 
illegality for abortion. They have attempted to identify particular 
“anatomical landmarks” that indicate the point at which an abortion 
supposedly occurs “outside the body” of the woman.289 They have also 
argued that the viability line should be replaced by a different line, such 
as the presence of fetal cardiac activity, supposedly due to “[r]ecent 
medical research.”290 The analysis in this article indicates, however, that 
these lines are and have always been moral and political ones, rather than 
scientific or medical ones. The tendency of spatial regulation to mask 
that reality and to suggest that line-drawing is a technical task should not 
override the logic and reasoning supporting existing legal rules in the 
abortion context. Though the recognition of this feature does not 
 
287 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860-61 (1992). 
288 Id. 
289 Supra text accompanying notes 177-183. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
186 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Instead of drawing the line at viability, the 
Court refers to Congress' purpose to differentiate ‘abortion and infanticide’ based not 
on whether a fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus is anatomically 
located when a particular medical procedure is performed.”). 
290 Forte, surpa note 209, at 140; see generally Marc Spindelman, On the Constitutionality of 
Ohio's Proposed "Heartbeat Bill", 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 150 (2013); John A. Robertson, 
Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (2015) (“Initially, the 
abortion debate concerned whether fetuses were living human beings. Opponents of 
abortion appealed to the science of biology, which showed that fetuses are indeed 
human, living, and individual. However, this biological fact did not mean that they are 
persons within the protection of the law.”); Robertson, supra note 210, at 390 (“Legal 
disputes arising from fetal sonograms, viability, fetal pain, and early prenatal diagnosis 
are less about the state of the science than they are about the meaning of that science 
within an existing structure of constitutional doctrine.”). 
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provide an independent constitutional basis for challenging mandatory 
ultrasound laws or abortion procedure bans, it should inform their 
analysis and may provide a tool for combating them in the political realm.  
Conclusion 
The “spatial turn” in abortion regulation has yielded benefits for 
those seeking to restrict access to abortion while creating new difficulties 
for those wishing to challenge abortion restrictions. The goal of this 
Article has been to examine the implications of this consequential shift 
and to consider some possible ways in which attending to the dynamics 
of spatial regulation could affect constitutional analysis in the abortion 
context. As the future of Roe v. Wade itself hangs in the balance, the need 
for new legal and political arguments for protecting reproductive liberty 
becomes even more pressing. Spatial regulation is simply too attractive a 
tool for legislators to resist. 
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